Legitimating Death by Bilionis, Louis D.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 91 Issue 7 
1993 
Legitimating Death 
Louis D. Bilionis 
University of North Carolina 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1643 (1993). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol91/iss7/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
LEGITIMATING DEATH 
Louis D. Bilionis * 
INTRODUCTION: RECALLING FURMAN 
On June 29, 1992, few people were aware that the day marked the 
twentieth anniversary of Furman v. Georgia. 1 Being an Eighth 
Amendment enthusiast, I thought it an appropriate occasion to reflect. 
Time may alter Furman's legal legacy, but it will never rob the 
decision of its decisive immediate impact. After all, it is not often that 
a single sweep of the judicial pen spares hundreds of lives, as Furman 
did when it declared the prevailing system of capital punishment un-
constitutional and cleared the nation's death rows. Nor should the 
passage of time lead us to underestimate the magnitude of the consti-
tutional project the Court undertook in Furman. Prior to Furman, 
the 1971 decision in McGautha v. California 2 had dampened any 
hopes that the Supreme Court would unfurl the federal constitutional 
banner and lead the charge for reform, despite the abolitionist litiga-
tion campaign of the 1960s which exposed the illegitimate state of the 
death penalty. Yet McGautha, as it turned out, merely set the stage 
for one of constitutional law's sweeter ironies. Just fourteen months 
later, the Burger Court - hardly known for its belief in the validity of 
constitutional adjudication as an agent of social change - reversed 
course to embark upon the single most expansive constitutional crimi-
nal procedure program in the Court's history. Working from a virtu-
ally clean slate, the Furman Court unleashed the Eighth 
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, fashioning the 
beginnings of a rich normative vision that has initiated and sustained a 
nationwide reform of the system of capital punishment. 3 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B. 1979, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1982, Harvard. -Ed. Marshall Dayan, Don 
Hornstein, Arnold Loewy, Mike Mello, Barry Nakell, and Rich Rosen offered helpful comments 
for which I am grateful. Special thanks go to Ann Hubbard for her support, her patience, and 
her countless valued insights. 
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). As fate would have it, the day's significance in constitutional history 
was secured shortly after 10:00 a.m., when the Court handed down the anxiously awaited deci-
sion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
2. 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (holding that Due Process Clause does not prohibit giving jury unbri-
dled discretion to sentence a murderer to death). 
3. For a discussion of the Court's about-face from McGautha to Furman, see Louis D. 
Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 283, 331-32 & n.156 (1991). 
Stressing Furman's pathbreaking significance implies no slight of the Warren Court's selec-
1643 
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And what reform activity Furman has wrought. Institutions of all 
stripes have taken a new interest in capital punishment and substan-
tially changed its administration and practice. 4 Change, I hasten to 
add, is by no means necessarily synonymous with cure. Many observ-
ers fear that the post-Furman reforms amount to a kind of cruel 
makeup job - dabs of legal formalism and streaks of moral rhetoric 
that paint a happy legitimate face on the still ugly visage. 5 The Court 
did nothing to assuage fears concerning the inadequacy of these re-
forms in McCleskey v. Kemp 6 when it dismissed statistical evidence of 
racial discrimination in capital punishment as legally insufficient, no 
matter how empirically sound, to impugn the practice's constitutional-
ity. 7 All the same, if the death penalty is to be a working feature of 
our criminal justice system - and for the foreseeable future, it surely 
tive incorporation cases. But, unlike the Burger Court's Furman, the Warren Court's most re· 
nowned accomplishments in the criminal field built upon principles that had long been identified 
in the Court's jurisprudence, heightening (but not initiating) federal constitutional regulation of 
the field. Before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (announcing per se right to 
appointed counsel), there was Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-73 (1942) (granting right to 
appointed counsel on case-by-case basis), overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. Before Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966) (establishing bright-line rules to guard against coerced 
confessions), there was Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936) (relying upon case-by-
case scrutiny to guard against coerced confessions). Even before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
655 (1961) (holding that fruits of unreasonable searches or seizures must be excluded at state 
trial), there was Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (forbidding use of evidence at 
state trial that was seized in a manner that shocked the conscience), and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 
U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (identifying "[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the police" as implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and thus enforceable against the states 
through the Due Process Clause, but leaving question of remedy for a violation of the right -
and, therefore, the exclusionary rule - to the states), overruled in part by Mapp, 367 U.S. at 653. 
See generally Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 51 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sc1. 238, 239-40 (1966) (discussing how Court's regulation of state 
criminal process typically grows incrementally). 
4. Given the American lawyer's preoccupation with case law, focus usually turns to the large 
body of constitutional death penalty jurisprudence spawned by Furman and its two most imme-
diate progeny, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280 (1976). For a full appreciation of Furman's impact, however, one must venture far from the 
pages of the United States Reports. The regulation of capital punishment today actively involves 
a diverse array of public and private actors - among them, state lawmakers and judges, state 
and federal administrative agencies, the prosecutorial and criminal defense communities, the or-
ganized bar, public interest groups, and the Congress. 
5. See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 9-10 (1989) (questioning the Court's "fiction" that pro-
cedural safeguards work to legitimate capital punishment); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON 
HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 87-91 (1986) (arguing that 
efforts to regularize capital punishment have failed and were doomed to fail); Vivian Berger, 
"Black Box Decisions" on Life or Death - If They're Arbitrary, Don't Blame the Jury: A Reply to 
Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (1991) ("[A]rbitrariness ••. 
will dog the administration of death."); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. 
REv. 305, 354 ("It is as if the constitutional strictures on the death penalty are merely a matter 
of legal aesthetics."). 
6. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
7. 481 U.S. at 308-13. 
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will be - society must acknowledge a responsibility to tend to its fair-
ness, its equity, and its morality. That was, after all, the point that 
condemned inmates pressed in McGautha and Furman, and by that 
measure alone Furman must be credited as a success. 
Reflecting on Furman in the light of recent developments, how-
ever, can make one wonder whether a requiem, and not a testimonial, 
is in order. Much that the Supreme Court says and does these days 
seems less than sympathetic to what many believe to be the gospel 
according to Furman and its 1976 sequels8 - that a death sentence's 
legitimacy depends upon strict compliance with stringent procedural 
safeguards designed to ensure that the constitutionally vexing risks of 
arbitrariness, capriciousness, discrimination, unfairness, factual error, 
legal error, and moral error do not materialize. The Court's campaign 
to bring the writ of habeas corpus within newly constrictive bounds9 
- culminating in its refusal, in Herrera v. Collins, 10 to provide a con-
demned inmate a federal hearing to present newly discovered evidence 
of his actual innocence - surely marks the sharpest and most amply 
chronicled 11 break with post-Furman ideas about what it takes to le-
8. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisi-
ana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
9. I use the word "campaign" advisedly, for there are important divisions of opinion among 
the Justices on the habeas question. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas 
appear to have embraced an "administrative" vision of habeas that employs the writ not to rem-
edy constitutional violations, but rather to keep state courts within the bounds of good faith. See 
Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2486-91 (1992) (opinion of Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, 
C.J., and Scalia, J.); see also James S. Liebman, More Than ''Slightly Retro'~· The Rehnquist 
Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 537, 543 & n.26 (1990-1991) (noting that Court's recent decisions suggest that federal 
habeas review of state court decisions may be analogized to judicial review of administrative 
agencies). Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have expressed discomfort with that vision and seem 
unprepared to abandon the traditionally adjudicative role of the habeas court. See 112 S. Ct. at 
2493-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); 112 S. Ct. at 2498-2500 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in judgment); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1721-27 (1992) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting, joined by Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ.); 112 S. Ct. at 1727-28 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
10. 113 s. Ct. 853 (1993). 
11. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied? - A Comment on Recent 
Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1665 (1990); John Blume 
& William Pratt, Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1990-
1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991); Steven M. Goldstein, Chipping Away at the 
Great Writ: Will Death Sentenced Federal Habeas Corpus Petitioners Be Able to Seek and Utilize 
Changes in the Law?, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357 (1990-1991); Joseph L. Hoffman, 
Starting from Scratch: Rethinking Federal Habeas Review of Death Penalty Cases, 20 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 133 (1992); Joseph L. Hoffmann, The Supreme Court's New Vision of Federal Habeas 
Corpus for State Prisoners, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 165; Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety 
Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 415 (1990-1991); James S. Liebman, 
Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1997 (1992); Liebman, supra note 9; Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 
HASTINGS L.J. 941 (1991); Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & 
1646 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1643 
gitimate a death sentence. Federal habeas traditionally has provided 
death cases with the searching scrutiny for procedural rectitude that 
they demand, 12 and the anticipation of such thoroughly probing fed-
eral review has enabled the Court to profess faith in the efficacy of its 
proceduralist tack toward the regulation of capital punishment. As 
Justice Blackmun rightly noted, "[t]he more the Court constrains the 
federal courts' power to reach the constitutional claims of those sen-
tenced to death, the more the Court undermines the very legitimacy of 
capital punishment itself."13 
But there are other apparent departures from Furman-style no-
tions of legitimacy. The Court's unprecedented display of impatience 
with Robert Harris' challenge to California's gas chamber on the eve 
of his execution comes to mind, 14 as does another recent first for the 
Court - the explicit overturning of Eighth Amendment precedent 
favorable to the capitally accused in the victim-impact case of Payne v. 
Tennessee. 15 A more generalized assault on Furman-era precedent, 
Justice Scalia's attack on the cornerstones of Woodson v. North Caro-
CRIMINOLOGY 9 (1990); Robin West, The Supreme Court 1989 Term - Foreword: Taking Free-
dom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv. 43 (1990); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. 
L. REv. 575 (1993). 
12. James Liebman reports: 
Counting only published decisions, the federal courts found constitutional error in 40% 
of the 361 capital judgments of conviction and sentence that those courts finally reviewed in 
habeas corpus proceedings between mid-1976 and mid-1991. The constitutional error rate is 
46% (of 408 cases) when discoverable unpublished decisions also are counted. 
Liebman, supra note 9, at 541 n.15. 
13. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2530 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); 
see Diane Wells, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty: A Need for a Return to the 
Principles of Furman, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 427 (1989) (arguing that cutbacks in 
federal habeas are inconsistent with principles underlying Furman). 
14. Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713, 1714 (1992) (ordering that "(n]o further stays of 
Robert Alton Harris' execution shall be entered by the federal courts except upon order of this 
Court."); Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (per curiam) ("There 
is no good reason for this abusive delay, which has been compounded by last-minute attempts to 
manipulate the judicial process."). The Harris litigation has provoked interesting critical com-
mentary. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the 
Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255 (1992); Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Law· 
less Execution of Robert Alton Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225 (1992); Stephen Reinhardt, The 
Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205 (1992); Symposium, 
Retrospective Forum: The Robert Alton Harris Execution, 40 UCLA L. REV. 295 (1992). 
15. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) and, in 
part, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), each of which forbade the use of victim-impact 
evidence in capital sentencing). The Court was doggedly determined to undo Booth and Gathers 
during its 1990 Term. The coup de grace surely would have come earlier, in Ohio v. Huertas, had 
it not been for a checkered record that caused the Court to dismiss the writ of certiorari in that 
case as improvidently granted. See Ohio v. Huertas, 111 S. Ct. 805, 806 (1991). Not long there-
after, the Court granted certiorari in Payne and requested the parties to address whether Booth 
and Gathers should be overruled. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 1031 (1991). See generally 
Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering - A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 21, 37-44 (1992) (discussing the petitions for writs of certiorari in Huertas 
and Payne). 
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Zina 16 and Lockett v. Ohio, 17 is underway and, although unsuccessful 
thus far, has managed to generate some heat. 18 This is not to mention 
the increasing number of cases in which the Court has turned aside a 
capitally accused's claim for constitutional protection.19 
Nor will the work of scholars and commentators inspire confidence 
in the vitality of Eighth Amendment law under Furman. Critics have 
been giving the Court's death penalty jurisprudence a bad name for 
years, chastising it as the chaotic product of unreasoned, result-ori-
16. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
17. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
18. Justice Scalia detailed his challenge to Woodson and Lockett in Walton v. Arizona, 497 
U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("I will not, in 
this case or in the future, vote to uphold an Eighth Amendment claim that the sentencer's discre-
tion has been unlawfully restricted."). See also Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528, 538 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (following his dissent in Walton); Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926, 
2929 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2130 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). For discussions of Scalia's views, see Ronald J. Allen, 
Foreword - Evidence, Inference, Rules, and Judgment in Constitutional Adjudication: The In-
triguing Case a/Walton v. Arizona, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 727, 738-43 (1991); Bi-
lionis, supra note 3, at 326-32; Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing 
Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 323, 402-18 (1992); Scott E. 
Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capi-
tal Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147, 1164-90 (1991); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, 
Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 
YALE L.J. 835, 859-66 (1992) (reviewing BEVERLY LoWRY, CROSSED OVER: A MURDER, A 
MEMOIR (1992)); see also Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 
67 (1992) (critiquing Justice Scalia's approach to capital punishment more broadly). 
19. E.g., Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993) (rejecting claim that Texas sentencing 
scheme, as applied, precluded consideration of mitigating evidence in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), narrowly interpreted); Lockhart v. 
Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993) (holding no ineffective assistance of counsel where attorney for 
death row inmate failed to raise claim which would have been meritorious under law prevailing 
at the time but which now lacks merit); Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991) (rejecting claim 
that jury should be instructed on all possible lesser-included offenses to capital murder that are 
supported by the evidence); Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (rejecting claim that 
capital defendant should enjoy broader voir dire of prospective jurors in light of pretrial public-
ity); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990) (affirming lenient standard for review of constitutional 
adequacy of aggravating circumstances); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (affirming 
placement upon the defendant of the burden to establish mitigating circumstances sufficient to 
call for a life sentence); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (declining to hold that third 
party has standing to assert that Constitution forbids another capitally sentenced individual from 
waiving appellate review); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (affirming propriety of 
appellate reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as means of curing trial-level 
error relating to capital sentencing); Saftle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) (holding that Constitu-
tion as construed to date does not dictate that sentencer must be free to base its decision on the 
sympathy it feels for the defendant after hearing mitigating evidence); Boyde v. California, 494 
U.S. 370 (1990) (upholding sentencing scheme that requires imposition of death sentence where 
mitigating circumstances are outweighed by aggravating circumstances); Blystone v. Penn-
sylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (upholding scheme that mandates imposition of death sentence 
where aggravating circumstance but no mitigating circumstance exists); Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361 (1989) (refusing to hold death penalty per se unconstitutional for the juvenile of-
fender); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (refusing to hold death penalty per se unconstitu-
tional for the mentally retarded offender); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (refusing to 
hold that death row inmates enjoy constitutional right to counsel to pursue collateral relief). 
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ented clashes between ideologically polarized Justices.20 Dozens of ar-
ticles each year take the Court to task for the wide array of outrages 
and blunders ostensibly committed during the preceding Term.21 In-
novative proposals to steer the law in new directions - anywhere 
other than where it seems to be headed - abound, with few, if any, 
kind words to be said for the path the Court has taken.22 To judge 
from the reviews, the Justices are at best making a serious mess of the 
Eighth Amendment and, at worst, submitting the jurisprudence that 
Furman begot to the proverbial death by a thousand cuts.23 
Can it be? 
Possibly so. But the evidence supports an alternative verdict as 
20. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 5, at 1082 (suggesting that the jurisprudence "has collapsed 
in substance, if not in form, not only because of its subsurface flaws but also because of the 
present Court's commitment to regulating capital sentencing solely in superficial ways"); Robert 
A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. RE.v. 1741, 
1781 (1987) (suggesting Court's jurisprudence "reveals an implicitly anarchic element marked by 
repeated fractionation"); Weisberg, supra note 5, at 306 (suggesting that Court's cases "reveal the 
art of legal doctrine-making in a state of nervous breakdown"). 
21. Among the more recent, and more provocatively entitled, of such works are the follow-
ing: Caminker & Chemerinsky, supra note 14; Michael Q. Berkley, Note, Constitutional Law -
What You Don't Know Can Kill You: The Rehnquist Court's Allowance of Unforeseeable Victim 
Impact Evidence in the Era of Disposable Precedent - Payne v. Tennessee, 27 WAKE FOREST L. 
REv. 741 (1992); Fred P. Cavese, Case Note, Clemons v. Mississippi - Shortcut to the Execu-
tioner?, 22 PAC. L.J. 935 (1991); Rebecca Dick-Hurwitz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: The 
Supreme Court Deals a Fatal Blow to Mentally Retarded Capital Defendants, 51 U. PITT. L. 
REv. 699 (1990); Andrew H. Friedman, Note, Tison v. Arizona: The Death Penalty and the 
Non-Triggerman: The Scales of Justice Are Broken, 15 CORNE.LL L. REV. 123 (1989); Daniel R. 
Harris, Note, Capital Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat from the "Death Is Differ-
ent" Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. RE.v. 1389 (1991); W. Lindman, Comment, "Cruel and Unusual" 
Checks and Balances: The Supreme Court Writes a Rubber Check, 30 DUQ. L. RE.v. 937 (1992); 
Robert T. Murphy, Note, On With the Apocalypse: The Supreme Court's New Approach to Old 
Problems of Equity, Novelty and Death, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1045 (1992); Lori L. Nader, Note, 
Walton v. Arizona: The Confusion Surrounding the Sentencing of Capital Defendants Continues, 
40 CATH. U. L. REv. 475 (1991); Michael I. Oberlander, Note, The Payne of Allowing Victim 
Impact Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. RE.V. 1621 (1992); K. Elizabeth 
Whitehead, Case Note, Mourning Becomes Electric: Payne v. Tennessee's Allowance of Victim 
Impact Statements During Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 45 ARK. L. RE.v. 531 (1992); Kenneth 
A. Zimmern, Note, Satterwhite v. Texas: A Return to Arbitrary Sentencing?, 42 BAYLOR L. 
REv. 623 (1990). 
22. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 18; Randall L. Kennedy, Mccleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital 
Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1388 (1988); Samuel H. Pillsbury, 
Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 14 CORNELL L. REV. 655 
(1989); Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility, and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty 
Cases from the 1989 Term, 1 Mo. J. CONTE.MP. LEGAL ISSUES 161 (1990); Paul v. Regelbrugge, 
Comment, Barbarism in the Plastic Bubble: An Application of Existentialist Theory to Capital 
Punishment in the United States, 4 DE.T. C.L. REv. 1011 (1990). 
23. One exception is WELSH s. WHITE, THE DEATH PE.NALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EX-
AMINATION OF THE MODE.RN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 17, 20-22 (1987) [hereinafter 
WHITE, DEATH PE.NALTY IN THE EIGHTIES] (questioning dire predictions that Court would 
deregulate capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment; predicting instead that Court 
would remain committed to Furman-era principles, though with some ambivalence). White has 
adopted a slightly more pessimistic view in the updated version of his book. See WELSH S. 
WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYS• 
TEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 3, 22-25 (1991). 
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well - provided you take the Court on at least some of its own terms, 
appreciate the challenges it faces, and appraise its efforts without un-
due passion or prejudice. This article attempts just that, and it arrives 
at the surprising conclusion that a meaningful Eighth Amendment 
death penalty jurisprudence lives on, that it is a quite intelligible juris-
prudence, and that it is driven by a coherent methodology with firm 
roots in the traditions of constitutional adjudication. 
To reach that conclusion, it is helpful first to have some sense of 
what the Supreme Court has been doing in the death penalty area 
lately. Part I thus presents a topical review of the Court's recent 
work, identifying the themes that now dominate, pointing out the con-
cerns those themes raise, and asking whether any sense can be made of 
the Court's ventures. Part II takes up that question, and concludes 
that a common, well-recognized constitutional methodology accounts 
for the Court's Eighth Amendment decisions. The Justices concede 
that the amendment contains significant normative content against 
which to assess the legitimacy of capital punishment, and they agree 
that the federal judiciary bears an important responsibility to see that 
the amendment's norms are enforced. But in discharging that obliga-
tion, the Court uses federal judicial power sparingly in order to ac-
commodate considerations of governmental structure, institutional 
capacity, and institutional responsibility. These concerns, too, carry 
constitutional credentials; to give them their due weight, the Justices 
- in a word - balance. 
Neither the methodology of balancing, nor the decisions it pro-
duces, will meet or should meet with universal approval. Indeed, I 
have my own qualms about the former, and the latter often trouble me 
a great deal. What is important - insofar as constitutional law is 
concerned, anyway - is that the Court's performance under the 
Eighth Amendment falls well within the parameters of an established 
tradition of adjudication. It may disappoint, it may elicit disagree-
ment, but it deserves respect. 
Those on the front lines of capital punishment administration have 
little reason to fear the model of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
offered in Part II, for it has powerful, positive implications for how 
America should deal with death penalty issues in the years to come. 
As Part III of the article demonstrates, an appreciation of the Court's 
balancing methodology under the Eighth Amendment liberates us to 
think creatively and to speak articulately about the roles that state 
constitutional law, judge-made interstitial law, and executive clemency 
should play in the nation's quest to legitimate the death penalty. 
These alternative sources of regulatory authority are no less obligated 
1650 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1643 
to respect basic Eighth Amendment values than are the federal courts. 
They are not, however, encumbered by the same institutional and 
structural limitations that face the federal judiciary, and thus they 
may enforce Eighth Amendment values - and, as Part III will illus-
trate, in appropriate circumstances must enforce those values - even 
though the federal judiciary's own balance dictates self-restraint. 
What emerges is an integrated vision of the regulation of capital 
punishment under Furman and the Eighth Amendment. Legitimating 
death, under this view, is a collective societal responsibility. Every 
governmental institution with the power to reach the question of capi-
tal punishment has a vital constitutional mission to perform, contrib-
uting - within its means, with due regard for its own limits - toward 
the realization of Eighth Amendment ideals. 
I. THE THEMES OF TODAY'S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Those who have become convinced that the Supreme Court's 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is a "fog of confusion ... annually 
improvised"24 would do well to reconsider. If there are shortcomings 
to be found in the Court's recent work in death cases, inconsistency 
and incoherence are not among them. The Court remains a committee 
of nine humans with differing perspectives, so there are still disagree-
ments and some resulting wrinkles in the doctrinal fabric. But what 
Paul Freund once said of an earlier Court's travels in controversial 
territory holds here too: "[T]he degree of concord in this area is much 
more important than the degree of discord .... "25 
Indeed, it is the concord that frightens capital punishment's oppo-
nents these days. Four strong themes, embraced by a consistent and 
substantial majority of the Justices, have dominated the Court's recent 
death penalty decisions, and the themes foretell a rise in the number of 
executions. 
First, the Court has been sharply reducing the involvement of the 
federal judiciary in the day-to-day business of reviewing capital cases. 
The Court's technique has been simple and direct: limiting the occa-
sions for the exercise of federal judicial power in capital cases by forti-
fying old, familiar barriers to habeas corpus review and erecting new 
ones. 
For years, procedural defaults in the presentation of an inmate's 
24. Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2242 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
25. PAUL A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 9 (1949) (referring to 
the Court's dealings in the field of civil liberties during the 1930s and 1940s). 
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federal constitutional claim to the state courts26 have operated to bar 
consideration of the claim in habeas. 27 In a series of cases culminating 
with Coleman v. Thompson, 28 the Court has made the standards for 
determining whether there has been a procedural default under state 
law - and, if so, whether it may be excused - rigorously preclusive. 
The technicalities which the habeas petitioner must successfully nego-
tiate in order to have a federal court adjudicate the merits of his claims 
are not, however, limited to those of a state's making. Working in the 
shadows of Congress' habeas legislation, the Court has been making 
new and restrictive federal procedural law. The petitioner must also 
comply with these technical rules if a federal court is to reach the 
substance of his constitutional claim. For example, an inmate's failure 
to raise a claim in his first application for habeas relief now amounts, 
under McCleskey v. Zant, 29 to a procedural default that can and prob-
ably will bar the claim from habeas consideration altogether. 30 In ad-
dition, though no statute of limitations governs habeas petitions, it 
now appears that a well-pied constitutional claim can be dismissed, for 
26. Of course, presentation of the claim to the state courts is normally a prerequisite to 
federal habeas review. See PAUL BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1552-60 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing requirement that state remedies 
be exhausted). 
27. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533-539 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 
478, 485-497 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81-91 (1977). 
28. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). The foundational cases are Smith, 477 U.S. at 533-39, Carrier, 
477 U.S. at 485-97, and Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 124-35 (1982). 
29. 111 s. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
30. See 111 S. Ct. at 1461-75. In theory, the petitioner's federal procedural default might be 
absolved upon a showing of either "cause and prejudice" or a "fundamental miscarriage of jus-
tice" - a showing which also would overcome the preclusive effect of a procedural default com-
mitted in state court. But given the narrow interpretation the Court has placed on these terms, 
the default will be fatal in most cases involving a second habeas filing. 
As for "cause," the Court has made it quite clear that a petitioner's inadvertence in failing to 
present a claim properly merits no sympathy. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 486-92; Engle, 456 U.S. at 
129-35. Shenanigans on the part of judicial, prosecutorial, or law enforcement officers that 
wholly impeded presentation of the claim at the appropriate time constitute "cause," see Amadeo 
v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1986), but, it seems, official deceit and chicanery that succeeded only 
in making development of the claim more difficult do not do so. See McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. 
Ct. 1454, 1474-75 (1991). "Cause" exists when the initial failure to raise the claim is due to 
attorney malfeasance that deprived the inmate of a constitutional right to the effective assistance 
of counsel, Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375-80 (1986), but this theory is of little 
consequence to the problem of second habeas petitions because the Court has held that death row 
inmates are not constitutionally entitled to counsel to help them properly raise their claims in 
their first habeas petitions. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
Finally, "cause" also exists when raising the claim earlier would have required the petitioner to 
perceive and advance a novel legal theory, Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. l, 12-16 (1984), but a claim 
meeting this definition is likely to falter under the Court's new retroactivity jurisprudence. 
The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception likewise affords little comfort for the 
second-time habeas applicant. In Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992), the Court sharply 
circumscribed the range of affronts that will establish the requisite fundamental miscarriage of 
justice. 112 S. Ct. at 2518-23. 
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equity's sake, on grounds of belatedness.31 
The foregoing procedural strictures, while substantial, seem trivial 
when compared to the major new hurdle now blocking adjudication of 
constitutional claims in habeas. Under the retroactivity doctrine un-
veiled in Teague v. Lane 32 and extended to capital cases in Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 33 even an impeccably preserved and convincing claim of 
constitutional error cannot be heard in habeas if it depends upon a 
"rule" that was not "dictated" by constitutional precedent which ex-
isted when the petitioner's case cleared the direct review process. 34 
Although the full reach of the Court's new retroactivity law remains 
to be determined, 35 its capacity for drastically reducing the role of the 
federal courts in death cases needs no elaboration.36 No longer does 
the Court think it an injustice - or, at least, an injustice cognizable in 
habeas - to execute an individual who has persistently and appropri-
ately sought relief from detrimental constitutional error.37 
The second theme involves a concerted effort by the Court to clar-
ify its capital punishment jurisprudence to facilitate state efforts to-
ward compliance and to lessen the need for federal supervision. Here, 
too, the Court's technique has been simple and direct: to the extent 
possible, it expresses the central constitutional concerns relating to the 
death penalty in formalistic terms that set predictable, attainable, and 
easily policed standards of behavior. The 1989 Term, rich with impor-
31. See Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (per curiam). 
For a recent expression of the Court's willingness to make law within the gaps of Congress' 
habeas legislation, see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1718-19 (1993). 
32. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
33. 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989). 
34. E.g., Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 
(1990). 
35. Indeed, the division of opinions that have surfaced in the Court's post-Teague cases 
causes one to doubt whether the current Court will prove any more successful than earlier Courts 
at developing a consistent approach to retroactivity and related issues on habeas. Compare 
Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2489-91 (1992) (opinion of Thomas, J,) (plurality opinion) 
(urging broad view of Teague's import) and 112 S. Ct. at 2500-03 (Souter, J., concurring in 
judgment) (employing broad definition of what constitutes a "new rule") with 112 S. Ct. at 2496-
98 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (taking narrower view of Teague) and 112 S. Ct. at 
2498-2500 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (analyzing Teague in narrow terms); compare 
Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1135-40 (1992) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (holding that neither 
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), nor Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), 
created a new rule) with 112 S. Ct. at 1140-46 (Souter, J., dissenting) (concluding otherwise); 
compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313-19 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (holding that 
decision did not create new rule) with 492 U.S. at 352-53 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (concluding otherwise). 
36. See Liebman, supra note 9, at 541. 
37. Whereas Teague denies defendants the advantages of beneficial new rules that emerge 
after their direct appeals have concluded, the Court has no problem with holding the defendants 
to adverse postfinality developments in the law. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 844 
(1993). 
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tant capital cases, saw the Justices enthusiastically pursuing this objec-
tive on each of the Eighth Amendment's two principal doctrinal 
fronts. The amendment envisions rational orderliness in the capital 
sentencing process, and thus requires that the state employ aggravat-
ing circumstances that effectively channel and guide the sentencer's 
discretion. 38 In Walton v. Arizona 39 and Lewis v. Jeffers, 40 the Court 
reduced this concern to a set of concrete rules that state judiciaries 
should be able to follow with relative ease.41 The Eighth Amendment 
also envisions that courts will only impose morally appropriate death 
sentences, and therefore requires that each capital sentencing decision 
be an individualized one made with due regard for all potential miti-
gating circumstances.42 Boyde v. California, 43 Blystone v. Penn-
sylvania, 44 and Sajjle v. Parks45 brought a measure of formulaic 
38. The principle of rational orderliness emerged as a central norm of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence in Furman and received its further elaboration four years later in Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). "Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body 
on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that 
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary 
and capricious action." 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion). Given the death penalty's severity, 
there must be a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the 
many in which it is not." 428 U.S. at 188 (plurality opinion) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). When pains are not taken to minimize the risks of 
arbitrariness or capriciousness, the death sentence becomes "cruel and unusual in the same way 
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., 
concurring); see Bilionis, supra note 3, at 295-300 (discussing principle of rational orderliness). 
39. 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
40. 497 U.S. 764 (1990). 
41. Justice O'Connor thus could say for an eight-Justice Court in late 1992: 
The relevant Eighth Amendment law is well defined. First, a statutory aggravating fac-
tor is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to furnish principled guidance for the choice be-
tween death and a lesser penalty. Second, in a "weighing" State, where the aggravating and 
mitigating factors are balanced against each other, it is constitutional error for the sentencer 
to give weight to an unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor, even if other, valid aggra-
vating factors obtain. Third, a state appellate court may rely upon an adequate narrowing 
construction of the factor in curing this error. Finally, in federal habeas corpus proceedings, 
the state court's application of the narrowing construction should be reviewed under the 
"rational factfinder" standard of Jackson v. Virginia. 
Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528, 534 (1992) (citations omitted); see also Arave v. Creech, 113 
S. Ct. 1534, 1540-42 (1993) (applying these standards); Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1545 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (agreeing with majority's statement of the applicable standards). 
42. The principle of moral appropriateness emerged as a central norm of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The Court struck down a 
mandatory death penalty for murder, reasoning that the fundamental respect for human dignity 
underlying the Eighth Amendment, as well as the evolved standards of societal decency that give 
additional content to the amendment, dictate that a death sentence should not be imposed when 
it is morally inappropriate for the particular offender or offense. See Bilionis, supra note 3, at 
288-95 (discussing principle of moral appropriateness). Starting with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586 (1978), the Court has fashioned a substantial body of legal doctrine to implement the norm. 
See Bilionis, supra note 3, at 300-26 (analyzing doctrine under Woodson and Lockett). 
43. 494 U.S. 370 (1990). 
44. 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
45. 494 U.S. 484 (1990). 
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simplicity to this concern as well. 46 
The formalistic lines drawn by the Court in these cases offer the 
states a clearer sense of the constitutional straight-and-narrow, mak-
ing a smoother-running capital punishment system the probable con-
sequence. The gain, however, comes at a cost. When constitutional 
rules of criminal procedure are chosen for their administrative conven-
ience, some mortgaging of the underlying constitutional values that 
inure to the individual's benefit usually occurs. Just as bright-line 
Fourth Amendment rules have been known to sacrifice individual pri-
vacy in the name of police and judicial expedience,47 crystalline Eighth 
Amendment rules sell short the ideals of rational orderliness and 
moral appropriateness in favor of the perceived needs of federal and 
state judicial administration. Walton and Jeffers, for example, sim-
plify state court compliance with the Eighth Amendment by holding 
that an aggravating circumstance need only receive an abstractly ade-
quate definition that the sentencer then proceeds to apply, within the 
bounds of reason, to the facts of the particular case. Our desire for 
consistency and rationality in capital sentencing might have been sig-
nificantly furthered had the Court required that an aggravating cir-
cumstance also prove its regularizing mettle in the run of cases. 48 
In a third trend that has characterized recent capital punishment 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has consistently tempered its desire 
for legal clarity whenever attaining it arguably requires the compro-
mise of legitimate state interests or more protection than necessary to 
46. Blystone upheld a sentencing scheme that requires imposition of the death sentence when 
the sentencer finds an aggravating circumstance but no mitigating circumstance. The Court rea· 
soned that the requirement of individualized sentencing is satisfied so long as there are no consti-
tutional failures relating to the consideration of mitigating circumstances. Blystone, 494 U.S. at 
305-09. Relying on Blystone, Boyde upheld a sentencing scheme that mandates imposition of the 
death sentence when mitigating circumstances are outweighed by aggravating circumstances. 
Boyde, 494 U.S. at 377. And Parks emphasized the circumscribed scope of mitigating evidence 
under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), by holding that sympathy is not, under current law, 
a constitutionally protected mitigating circumstance. Parks, 494 U.S. at 492-95. 
47. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463-72 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing Court's adoption of bright-line rule authorizing extensive search of passenger com-
partment of automobile as incident to arrest); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238-59 
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's adoption of bright-line rule authorizing ex-
tensive search of individual as incident to lawful arrest); Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever 
and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. P1rr. L. REV. 227, 230-31 (1984); David A. Strauss, The 
Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 191-92 & n.10 (1988). See generally 
Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures'~· The Robin· 
son Dilemma, 1974 SUP. Cr. REV. 127; Wayne R. LaFave, Constitutional Rules for Police: A 
Matter of Style, 41 SYRACUSE L. REv. 849, 852-56 (1990); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth 
Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and Good Faith, 43 U. P1rr. L. 
REV. 307 (1982). 
48. Several years ago, my colleague Rich Rosen demonstrated how illuminating such a cross-
case inquiry can be. See Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance 
in Capital Cases - The Standard/ess Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941 (1986). 
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secure the accused's constitutional interest. In such circumstances, 
the Court's response once again has been simple and direct: it imple-
ments fact-bound, case-specific standards. So it was in Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 49 which replaced Booth v. Maryland'ss0 plain prohibition of 
victim-impact evidence with a less-protective, indeed fundamentally 
amorphous, ban on unduly prejudicial evidence of the same nature.st 
So it was, as well, in Schad v. Arizona. s2 There, the Court declined to 
read Beck v. Alabama s3 to require that a jury receive instruction on 
every factually supported lesser-included offense in a capital prosecu-
tion; it instead held that constitutional error occurs only when the ab-
sence of the lesser-included offense instruction affects the reliability of 
the jury's capital murder verdict. s4 The states, of course, hardly de-
plore the absence of hard-and-fast rules in these cases, for the tradeoff 
is a positive one from their perspective. The standards espoused are 
open-ended enough to leave considerable running room for the ad-
vancement of a state's chosen interests, yet fact dependent enough to 
minimize sharply the risk of federal reversal. 
As a fourth and final theme, the Court has been actively outlining 
ways for state appellate courts to avoid remanding for full-fledged re-
sentencing proceedings those cases in which constitutional error has 
been committed. With conspicuous dictum in Satterwhite v. Texas ss 
and Clemons v. Mississippi, S6 the Justices instructed state courts that 
at least some constitutional defects in the sentencing process are open 
to harmless error analysis under the Chapman v. California s7 stan-
dard. And with even more conspicuous dictum in Clemons, a then-
slim, but now larger, majority announced its view that a state appel-
late court can salvage a constitutionally flawed death sentence by inde-
pendently reweighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
and determining anew that death is the appropriate punishment - in 
49. 111 s. Ct. 2597 (1991). 
50. 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled in part by Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611; see also South Caro-
lina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (extending Booth to prosecutorial arguments), overruled by 
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611. 
51. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608. 
52. 111 s. Ct. 2491 (1991). 
53. 447 U.S. 625 (1980). 
54. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2505. 
55. 486 U.S. 249 (1988). 
56. 494 U.S. 738 (1990). 
57. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Satterwhite, evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), had been errone-
ously admitted. Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 258. In Clemons, the error involved the use of an un-
constitutionally vague aggravating circumstance in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 741. 
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short, by conducting a constitutionally adequate resentencing on ap-
peal. The message to state appellate courts could hardly be clearer: if 
your subordinates on the trial bench cannot do death right, no matter 
-just do it yourself. Perhaps a death sentence remains "different," 
but not so different that it must rest upon a constitutionally sound 
judgment rendered by a sentencer who personally hears the testimony, 
personally eyes the witnesses, and personally encounters the individual 
defendant. 
The fact that the Justices thus far have been rather scrupulous 
about what constitutes a satisfactory harmless error analysis58 or ap-
pellate reweighing59 provides some consolation, as does the hope that 
the Court will continue to recognize important and necessary restric-
tions on both doctrines. 60 In the final analysis, though, the effect these 
doctrines have upon the fundamental justice of capital punishment de-
pends on what transpires once the Court resolves the finer points and, 
as it surely will, turns its docket over to fresher concerns. Will the 
state courts then administer the teachings of the Court with care and 
devotion to their spirit? Or will they cut the Constitution's comers by 
diluting the standards in their application, something that Judge 
Frank Easterbrook has acknowledged they now do in the harmless 
error field?61 When transgressions occur, will the lower federal courts 
sit empowered in habeas to rectify them?62 Or will some new contrac-
tion of habeas corpus insulate state court infidelities from meaningful 
federal scrutiny?63 
Questions like these illustrate why today's capital punishment ju-
risprudence provokes such acute anxiety in those who see in Furman a 
58. See Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2122-23 (1991) (holding that state court opinion 
was inadequate to demonstrate that a constitutionally adequate harmless error analysis had been 
undertaken); Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731, 736-39 (1991) (holding that harmless error analy-
sis is inadequate when based on a perception of the facts that is not fairly supported by the 
record); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 753-54 (1990) (indicating that harmless error 
conclusion would be hard to accept on facts presented); see also Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 
249, 258 (1988) (holding that error could not be deemed harmless); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 
U.S. 393, 399 (1987) (holding that error could not be deemed harmless); Skipper v. South Caro-
lina, 476 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1986) (disagreeing with lower court's finding of harmless error). 
59. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750-52 (1990). 
60. I have outlined some of those restrictions elsewhere. See Bilionis, supra note 3, at 316-
25. 
61. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1373 (7th Cir. 1991), ajfd., 113 S. Ct. 1710 
(1993). 
62. They currently do. See Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1134-40 (1992); Parker v. 
Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731, 737-40 (1991). 
63. It is possible that Brecht, 113 S. Ct. 1710, might have such an insulating effect. The 
Court held in Brecht that a habeas petitioner who establishes constitutional error of the trial 
variety is not entitled to relief unless the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence 
on the judgment. 
June 1993] Legitimating Death 1657 
strict mandate for legitimating the death penalty. That view of 
Furman holds that legitimacy is attained only when the risks of arbi-
trariness, capriciousness, moral unreliability, and unfairness in capital 
sentencing have been eliminated, or at least minimized substantially 
and to the full extent permitted by society's best efforts. 64 The essen-
tial ingredient of this legitimation strategy is a strong and unyielding 
federal judicial commitment to perform two central tasks: (1) to set 
forth stringent procedural safeguards which further the basic Eighth 
Amendment norms of rational orderliness, moral appropriateness, and 
procedural fairness;65 and (2) to insist that the states implement and 
faithfully adhere to those safeguards whenever they impose the death 
penalty. Put simply, the four dominant themes of today's capital juris-
prudence signal, individually and in tandem, a distinct erosion of that 
federal judicial commitment. 
The Supreme Court still mandates procedural safeguards that aim 
to advance Eighth Amendment values, but the only rules the Court 
seems willing to impress with constitutional credentials are those that 
have been made safe for state consumption - buffered standards that 
pursue the Eighth Amendment's goals tentatively and conditionally, 
after due assurance that they pose no serious threat to state efforts to 
64. As followers of the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence will be quick to point out, 
there has never been any formal agreement among the Justices on what Furman and the bell-
wether 1976 decisions interpreting Furman really meant. The broad view of Furman just 
sketched in the text represents but one interpretation, the one typically advanced by opponents of 
capital punishment and the one taken by Justices Brennan and Marshall and, with minor devia-
tions, Justices Blackmun and Stevens. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 676 n.1 (1990) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.) ("Our cases ... 'insis[t] that capital punishment be 
imposed, fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all.'") (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)). 
That view is detailed and explored in Part II.A of this article. In Part 11.B, similar attention 
is paid to what I contend to be the chief and now dominant competing view of constitutional 
capital punishment jurisprudence under Furman. 
65. In addition to the principles of rational orderliness and moral appropriateness, the princi-
ple of heightened procedural fairness also has figured prominently in modern capital punishment 
jurisprudence at the constitutional level. Invoking at turns the Due Process Clause and the 
Eighth Amendment, the Court has often stated its conviction that special procedural opportuni-
ties and protections should extend to the capitally accused in order to ensure a fairness of process 
and a reliability of result that are commensurate with the severity and irrevocability of the death 
penalty. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1986) (opinion of White, J.) (requiring 
voir dire of jury regarding racial prejudices in capital prosecution for interracial murder); Skip-
per v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. l, 5 n.1 (1986) (noting that due process dictates that defense in 
capital case must be allowed to review and deny or explain any factor which the sentencer is 
permitted to take into account in the sentencing determination); 476 U.S. at 10-11 (Powell, J., 
concurring in judgment) (advancing reasoning of the majority); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 
97 (1979) (requiring admission of important mitigating evidence notwithstanding its hearsay na-
ture); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-62 (1977) (requiring disclosure to defense of presen-
tencing report in capital case); see also Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for 
Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. R.E.v. 1143 (1980) (arguing that the risk of 
moral error in capital sentencing that underlies the requirement of heightened procedural protec-
tions also establishes the penalty's unconstitutionality). 
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build and run an efficient death penalty system. What is more, Teague 
v. Lane's66 injunction against the making of new constitutional law in 
habeas corpus renders it unlikely that any additional procedural re-
quirements will enter the picture unless and until the Supreme Court, 
in the exercise of its direct appellate jurisdiction in state criminal 
cases, says they may. 
The contingent and restrained nature of the federal judicial com-
mitment extends to the enforcement side of the ledger as well. With 
habeas corpus substantially contracted, an execution no longer must 
wait until a thorough and searching federal review determines that the 
rules deemed fundamental to the game have been obeyed. Nor will a 
conceded failure to play by the rules necessarily elicit a federal com-
mand to do it anew and get it right. Notwithstanding the fragile, 
highly nuanced, and essentially unknowable nature of a sentencer's 
decision to impose the death sentence, 67 constitutional errors commit-
ted in the process leading to that decision may be dismissed as harm-
lessly inconsequential or held to have been "cured" - skeptics might 
say merely masked - by a state appellate court's independent re-
weighing of the facts and its declaration that death remains the appro-
priate punishment. 
Are we to conclude that the Court's gestures in death cases 
amount to so much smoke and so many mirrors, barely obscuring the 
fact that the long-predicted "deregulation" of capital punishment68 
has finally arrived? There are rumblings to that effect from lawyers 
who litigate death cases, and they have a point. In the 1970s, when 
capital defendants enjoyed a virtually uninterrupted run of victories in 
the Court, it was easy to believe that the Court's commitment to sub-
mit the death penalty to the rule of law was heartfelt. 69 Faith came 
harder in the 1980s, as defendants began to see some of their dearest 
claims lose.70 Interspersed among those setbacks, however, were a 
66. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
67. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2522 (1992); James C. Scoville, Note, Deadly 
Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 740, 754-57 (1987). 
68. Weisberg, supra note 5, at 305. The question is being asked today. See, e.g., Franklin E. 
Zimring, Inheriting the Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment in the 1990s, 20 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 7, 17 (1992). 
69. See Weisberg, supra note 5, at 306-07. 
70. For most observers, the turning point came with the Court's 1983 decisions in California 
v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983), Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 
U.S. 880 (1983), and Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983). See WHITE, DEATH PENALTY IN 
THE EIGHTIES, supra note 23, at 12-15; William S. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the 
Supreme Court's Recent Retreat from Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 
739 (1985); Weisberg, supra note 5, at 358; Richard E. Wirick, Note, Dark Year on Death Row: 
Guiding Sentencer Discretion After Zant, Barclay, and Harris, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 689, 729 
(1984). Within four years, the Court would reject the remaining centerpiece claims on the aboli-
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number of comforting contributions to the regulatory cause, 71 and, 
most importantly, Furman's keepers still sat four strong on the Court, 
guaranteeing that the fulfillment of its promise was never more than a 
vote away. The 1990s, to put it mildly, offer no such reassurances. 
Justices Brennan and Marshall have exited, leaving only Harry 
Blackmun and John Paul Stevens to advanceFurman's legitimacy ide-
als in a pure voice. The remainder of the Court has taken charge of 
the Eighth Amendment and, as we have seen, its decisions consistently 
strike themes antithetical to those ideals. A sleeker death penalty ju-
risprudence, built more for speed and efficiency than for normative 
safety, is coming on line. Predictably, executions are on the rise.72 
Thus told, the tale of the Eighth Amendment's demise sounds 
compelling. But, like most stories, this one has another side to it. For 
starters, consider the highly significant fact that, with one-and-a-half 
exceptions, no member of the Court today openly contests the consti-
tutional stature of the norms that have driven Eighth Amendment 
death penalty jurisprudence for the past twenty years. Justice Scalia's 
patience with the concept of mitigation and the values it serves has 
certainly expired, 73 and Justice Thomas has revealed some inclination 
to join Scalia in that view, 74 but the rest of the Court currently adheres 
to all three of the normative propositions central to modem Eighth 
Amendment law - that capital sentencing decisions should aspire to-
ward moral appropriateness, should be reached in a rational and or-
derly fashion, and should be rendered with a heightened procedural 
fairness befitting the gravity of the consequences to the individual. 
Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, once a steadfast opponent of any effort 
to read meaning into the Eighth Amendment for death cases, 75 no 
tionist agenda. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting claim that post-Furman 
procedural safeguards fail to eliminate arbitrariness and racial discrimination); Lockhart v. Mc-
cree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (rejecting challenge to practice of "death-qualifying" jury). 
71. E.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 
(1988); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); 
Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); Skipper v. South Caro-
lina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 
68 (1985); see WHITE, DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES, supra note 23, at 15-18 (discussing 
Court's decisions during the mid-1980s). 
72. See DEATH Row, U.S.A., Winter 1992, at 5 (bulletin published by NAACP Legal Def. 
and Educ. Fund, Inc.) (documenting 27 executions during 1992, the largest number in any one 
calendar year since Furman). 
73. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 646-74 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment); see also Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926, 2929 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2130 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
74. See Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903-15 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
75. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 628-36 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 371 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
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longer actively resists recognition of the amendment's normative rele-
vance to the practice of capital punishment. 76 
Admittedly, appearances can be deceiving. The United States 
Code does not yet prohibit lip service in judicial opinions; in the end, 
only conscience, self-awareness, and self-respect stand in the way of 
the Justice who might be tempted to publicly extol principles he or she 
long ago privately ceased to honor. I am among those who prefer to 
take the Justices at their word until strong evidence to the contrary 
warrants otherwise - a position, I realize, that not all observers share 
and that some would dismiss as naive. Be that as it may, crediting the 
Court's acceptance of the basic norms of the Eighth Amendment does 
not require blind faith, for the Court has reaffirmed and furthered each 
of them in important ways in some of its most recent decisions. 
Morgan v. Illinois, 77 which holds that jurors predisposed against 
mitigating evidence have no business deciding questions of life and 
death, deserves a place next to Woodson v. North Carolina, 78 Lockett 
v. Ohio, 79 and Caldwell v. Mississippi 80 in the book of paeans to relia-
ble, individualized moral decisionmaking. 81 The Court likewise has 
lent its support to the principle of rational and orderly capital sentenc-
ing lately. In Clemons v. Mississippl 82 Stringer v. Black, 83 Espinosa v. 
Florida, 84 and Richmond v. Lewis, 85 strong majorities confirmed that 
the use of vague statutory aggravating factors violates the Constitution 
even though the sentencer's discretion is otherwise channeled. Daw-
son v. Delaware 86 limited the types of evidence admissible against capi-
tal defendants. There, the Court set aside a death sentence returned 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 308-24 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also 
Alan I. Bigel, William H. Rehnquist on Capital Punishment, 17 Omo N.U. L. REV. 729, 739-42 
(1991) (discussing Rehnquist's initial resistance to Eighth Amendment regulation of capital 
punishment). 
76. See, e.g., Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1140 (1992) (joining the Court in finding 
error in failure to circumscribe sentencer discretion, and in concluding that reversal of sentence 
did not require creation of new constitutional rule); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-
64 (1988) (joining the Court in finding error in the failure to circumscribe sentencer discretion); 
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (joining the Court in finding erroneous re-
striction on sentencer's discretion to consider mitigating evidence). 
77. 112 s. Ct. 2222 (1992). 
78. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
79. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
80. 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
81. On the interrelationships between mitigating evidence, jury selection, and Caldwell, see 
Bilionis, supra note 3, at 306-08. 
82. 494 U.S. 738 (1990). 
83. 112 s. Ct. 1130 (1992). 
84. 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992). 
85. 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992). 
86. 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992). 
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by a jury that had become acquainted with the inflammatory but irrel-
evant fact that the defendant was a member of a racist prison gang. In 
two important cases from Florida, Parker v. Dugger87 and Sochor v. 
Florida, 88 the Court made clear that Barclay v. Florida 89 never meant 
to give state courts carte blanche to play fast and loose with the ad-
ministration of their own state law standards relating to aggravating 
circumstances. Because a sentencer's erroneous use of an aggravating 
circumstance in contravention of state law might mean that the scales 
were arbitrarily tipped in death's favor, the Eighth Amendment re-
quires that the effect of such an error be assessed in a principled fash-
ion with fidelity to the particular facts of the record and the actual 
process of decisionmaking undertaken in the case. Finally, procedural 
decency received a promotion in Lankford v. Idaho, 90 which held that 
the defendant was deprived of due notice that the death sentence was a 
genuine and not merely theoretical possibility in his case. 
If the Court means to abandon the Eighth Amendment and der-
egulate death, it has chosen a strange and seemingly counterproduc-
tive way to do it. Perhaps befuddlement and confusion reign in the 
High Court. Then again, maybe the Justices have some idea of what 
they are doing. 
II. APPROACHING LEGITIMACY: METHODOLOGY IN THE COURT 
In fact, there is a way to conceptualize capital punishment adjudi-
cation that casts the Court's recent efforts in a more flattering light. It 
requires that one walk through the problem of death penalty regula-
tion under the Constitution as might a conscientious Justice coming to 
the problem for the first time today - isolating the central issues fac-
ing the Court, the values and interests at stake, and the choices that 
ultimately must be made. 
Our starting point is the same fundamental question that has faced 
every Justice who has had to pass judgment in a death case since the 
constitutional implications of capital punishment began to draw the 
Court's attention in the 1960s. Does constitutional law have a role to 
play in securing a more decent and legitimate administration of the 
death penalty and, if so, what is that role?91 
87. 111 S. Ct. 731 (1991). 
88. 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992). 
89. 463 U.S. 939 (1983). 
90. 111 s. Ct. 1723 (1991). 
91. Of course, the question assumes that the Constitution does not categorically prohibit 
capital punishment, and that any constitutional strictures therefore will be of the regulatory vari-
ety. No one on the Court today disputes the holding of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), 
that the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional. 
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One possible answer makes quick work of our inquiry: "No. Con-
stitutional law has nothing to do with the issue." The supporting ar-
gument has a familiar cast to it. The Constitution explicitly 
contemplates the possible use of the death penalty and therefore can 
bear no construction that leads to capital punishment's abolition. 
Matters relating to the legitimacy of the death penalty in its applica-
tion implicate the kind of debatable or, worse, intractable details 
which the Constitution makes no effort to resolve but assigns to the 
workaday play of social policy. This reading of the Constitution, and 
the hands-off approach to the death penalty's legitimacy it counsels, 
certainly had currency in 1971, when John Marshall Harlan and a 
majority of the Court endorsed it in McGautha v. California. 92 But 
this position is not likely to win serious support on the Court today, 
regardless of whatever intrinsic appeal it might have in a case of first 
impression. The Court has spent two busy decades refuting Mc-
Gautha, and, though never given the grand funeral associated with an 
express overruling, the decision lies buried beneath a capital punish-
ment jurisprudence of monumental proportions. Whatever else this 
formidable precedent has accomplished, it surely makes untenable any 
current claim that constitutional inquiry into the legitimacy of death 
penalty practices cannot be undertaken because the Constitution is 
mute on the point. The nation has listened to the Eighth Amend-
ment's normative pronouncements too long for the Court to tell us 
now that they do not exist, that they have no meaning, that they lack 
suitable pedigree, or that they are somehow unjusticiable. The values 
of moral appropriateness, rational orderliness, and procedural fairness 
comprise a sound and respectable constitutional vocabulary, too en-
trenched in case law to ignore and demonstrably sufficient to conduct 
a meaningful constitutional discourse. 
Conceding that the Constitution speaks to the issue, and that the 
Burger Court's careful examination of the Eighth Amendment in the 
1970s succeeded in correctly identifying its normative language,93 an-
swers our question only in part. Ascertaining the relevant constitu-
tional values, the bookish exercise that one might label "norm 
articulation,"94 is doubtless an essential predicate to constitutional ad-
92. 402 U.S. 183, 207-08 (1971). 
93. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
94. The process of "norm articulation" is what customarily comes to mind when people 
think of constitutional litigation: aided by the submissions of litigants and interested amici as 
well as the labors of their own chambers, the Justices wend their way through constitutional text, 
history, precedent, and other source materials to ascertain the normative vision against which the 
constitutionality of challenged social practices might then be tested. 
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judication. In Justice Brennan's words, it establishes "the reach of the 
Constitution" in the area.95 But constitutional adjudication goes no-
where until the Court also determines the extent of the judicial grasp 
in that same field. The Court must define the role that it can and 
should play in implementing the constitutional norms it has 
identified. 9 6 
Here is the point in constitutional adjudication where the harder 
choices arise and the starker divisions of opinion crop up. The Court's 
task of "role definition" involves a wide array of appraisals over which 
reasonable jurists easily might disagree - even though they start from 
shared premises about the norms at stake and the need for judicial pro-
tection of them What judicial techniques are available to the Court? 
Which ones will help successfully realize Eighth Amendment norms in 
our complex and stubbornly imperfect world? How well will they 
work in transforming social practices for the better? At what cost to 
the Court's limited reservoir of capital - and how limited, by the 
way, is that reservoir? Which judicial vulnerabilities will be exposed, 
and what significance should be attached to this exposure? What 
other values stand to suffer in the process of enforcing Eighth Amend-
ment norms? How dearly do we hold those other values, and accord-
ing to what standard of reference? To what extent, and under what 
justifying conditions, may the Court sacrifice these values? Are other 
institutions positioned to lend a hand in the quest to better realize 
Eighth Amendment values? How will they respond to the Court's ac-
95. William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from 
the Court, 100 HARV. L. R.Ev. 313, 319 (1986). 
96. See, e.g., id. at 319 (noting that capital cases challenged the Court to determine both "the 
reach of the Constitution and the role of the Court in such cases"); Louis Michael Seidman, 
Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal 
Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 436, 440 (1980) ("Setting forth norms and implementing them 
are, however, two different matters .... "). 
The generations that came of age in the glow and afterglow of Warren Court constitutional 
activism may be forgiven if their instincts lead them to view the Supreme Court's work product 
as "the Constitution" in its definitive exposition. But lawyers of earlier generations had no prob-
lem with the idea that the Constitution's normative reach may and frequently does exceed the 
Supreme Court's grasp. As Professor Lawrence Sager has demonstrated in a stimulating article 
that sets forth insights I will be putting to use later in this article, the proposition "enjoys a 
venerable provenance" in our constitutional heritage, forming the conceptual basis of the theory 
of judicial restraint articulated by James Bradley Thayer and brought to the Court by the likes of 
Louis D. Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Felix Frankfurter, and John Marshall Harlan. 
Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1222-24 (1978). For Thayer's development of the judicial restraint thesis, 
see James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
Laurence Tribe's paraphrase sums it up well: "[I]t is, after all, a constitution, and not merely 
its judicial management, that we are expounding." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW§ 1-9, at 17 (2d ed. 1988) (paraphrasing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316 (1819)). 
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tions? Will their contributions slacken or intensify, and with what ef-
fect on the net result of the entire enterprise? These are just some of 
the considerations that a disciplined approach to the problem might 
take into account. 
Fortunately, we need not plunge headfirst into that thicket and 
thrash a path through each and every thorny issue therein. The Jus-
tices have greatly simplified our inquiry by simplifying their own. 
Over the years, they have narrowed the problem of role definition to a 
choice between two basic approaches. I will explore each of these ap-
proaches in turn. 
A. Legitimacy and the Liberal School of Furman: Enforcing 
Norms to the Maximum 
I have already made some reference to the first approach. It is the 
one that the Court's more liberal members have advanced since 
Furman and that the death penalty's strongest foes believe to be the 
essence of Furman and the regulatory project it initiated. Under this 
view, choosing the Court's proper role in the capital punishment 
sphere is not complicated. The judgments that matter most can be 
made at the wholesale level, and when rightly reached they dictate 
that the Court's role should be to promote and defend Eighth Amend-
ment norms to the maximum extent possible in each and every 
instance. 
Justices Brennan and Marshall promoted this view for many years, 
with Justices Blackmun and Stevens joining them in part but not en-
tirely.97 The approach's central points are easily summarized. Eighth 
Amendment values, like other aspirations to individual liberty recog-
nized in the Bill of Rights, rightly assume a preferred position in the 
constitutional pantheon and deserve uncompromising judicial protec-
tion commensurate with their fundamental status.98 A vigorous en-
forcing role for the Court is all the more imperative once one considers 
capital punishment's particulars. At issue is the purposeful extin-
guishing of human life, and a constitutional hierarchy worth its moral 
salt must acknowledge that an individual's protected interests merit 
the utmost judicial solicitude when life literally hangs in the balance.99 
Nor are there convincing reasons for the Court to hold back out of 
97. Given the frequency with which Justices Blackrnun and Stevens voted with Justices 
Brennan and Marshall in death cases, death penalty lawyers and Court watchers tended to char-
acterize the four as a single voting bloc. There were important differences between the two pairs, 
however. See infra note 106. 
98. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268-69 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
99. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 309 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
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deference to the judgments of the political departments. Political dis-
course about the death penalty is notorious for generating far more 
heat than light, with the debaters invariably focusing on a different 
question than the one of concern to the Court - whether the death 
penalty should exist, rather than how to administer it in a dependably 
and fundamentally legitimate manner - and, even then, typically pro-
ceeding from poorly informed premises. I00 The individuals with con-
stitutional interests at stake, moreover, are by definition heinous 
villains accused of brutal crimes, and they almost always come from 
the ranks of society's powerless downtrodden. IOI It nears folly to ex-
pect the political process to produce the kind of carefully reasoned and 
sensitively drawn accommodations between the public's penological 
goals and the individual's constitutional interests that might warrant 
special judicial deference. Finally, the legitimate state interests under-
lying capital punishment do not weigh heavily enough to militate 
against a regime of strictest judicial enforcement of Eighth Amend-
ment norms. Presuming that there is a social gain represented by the 
margin between life imprisonment and capital punishment, there is no 
good reason to believe it is more than marginal and mainly sym-
bolic. I02 Judicial action to enforce and protect genuinely fundamental 
values - including those founded in the Eighth Amendment - can-
not be withheld simply because social interests point in a contrary di-
rection. Only the most compelling interests should give the Court 
pause, and no such interests are conceivably implicated. 
While much could be written about the liberal call for maximum 
judicial enforcement of Eighth Amendment values just sketched, three 
of its aspects merit our attention here. First, note the approach's basic 
strategy. Its evident aim is to save Eighth Amendment norms from 
the kind of gradual erosion they predictably might suffer if their judi-
cial enforcement were to depend on how courts happen to weigh them, 
in case after case, against the passel of possible countervailing interests 
and concerns. The approach avoids the norm-threatening business of 
ad hoc, case-by-case balancing by establishing a rigid decisional frame-
work. Eighth Amendment norms, under this framework, are pre-
vens, JJ.) (noting that the qualitative difference between death and other punishments requires 
heightened "reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment"). 
100. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 362-63 (Marshall, J., concurring) (contending that a well-
informed citizenry would reject capital punishment); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 5, at 38-
45 (noting heated, irrational political discourse regarding capital punishment). 
101. E.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 249-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); Furman, 408 U.S. at 363-
69 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
102. E.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 301-05 (Brennan, J., concurring); Furman,.408 U.S. at 345-
54 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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sumptively entitled to full enforcement - in much the same way, and 
for essentially the same reasons, that other fundamental interests are 
presumptively entitled to full enforcement under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's strict scrutiny doctrines.103 Interest balancing is not es-
chewed altogether, but it is confined primarily to a global evaluation, 
performed by the Supreme Court alone and undertaken before any 
particular question of death penalty practice ever reaches adjudica-
tion.104 The Court appraises the competing interests potentially at 
stake - the Eighth Amendment norms running to the individual's 
benefit and the practical and prudential factors which might counsel 
judicial restraint in implementing those norms - in categorical terms 
and at a level of generality that precludes any nuanced distinctions or 
finely calibrated accommodations. Eighth Amendment norms win 
this showdown convincingly, 105 establish their "fundamental" creden-
tials in the course of doing so, and gain a presumptive entitlement to 
exacting judicial protection in all subsequent litigation. Theory does 
not demand an irrebuttable presumption of maximum enforcement. 
Eighth Amendment norms, like the fundamental values protected by 
strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, might be overcome 
when genuinely compelling state interests cannot otherwise be attained 
satisfactorily. That theoretical concession has little bearing in prac-
tice, however, because alternative punishments generally exist that will 
serve the penological goals underlying capital punishment acceptably, 
though perhaps not completely.106 
103. Note the pronounced "Carolene Products footnote four" flavor of the argument for 
maximum enforcement of Eighth Amendment values. For discussions of United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), and strict judicial scrutiny, see JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsr 75-77, 148-53 (1980); TRIBE, supra note 96, § 16·6, at 
1451-54. 
104. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
L.J. 943, 948 (1987) (distinguishing "global" and "ad hoc" balancing). 
105. Few would eagerly quarrel with the proposition that norms of individual liberty, admit-
tedly rooted in the Constitution, belong as a general rule at - or at least very near - the top of 
our constitutional hierarchy, particularly when human life hinges upon their treatment. By con-
trast, competing structural or institutional considerations that might counsel judicial restraint 
lose much of their force - and threaten to prove all too much - when pressed categorically. 
106. Though he did not have capital punishment jurisprudence in mind, Gerald Gunther's 
familiar phrase perfectly captures the approach to judicial review advocated by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall under the Eighth Amendment: "[S]crutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in 
fact .... " Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model far a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 
(1972). Of course, Brennan and Marshall were both fundamentally opposed to capital punish-
ment and wished to see it abolished. One might fairly wonder whether their insistence upon such 
stringent scrutiny was an attempt to bring about indirectly what they could not accomplish di-
rectly. 
It is on this point that Justices Blackmun and Stevens parted company with their now-retired 
brethren. Neither Justice Blackmun nor Justice Stevens holds a categorical constitutional objec-
tion to the death penalty, and both Justices have been willing over the years to pay greater heed 
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Second, note the approach's clear, unadulterated conception of 
what it means for the Court to say that a death sentence is constitu-
tionally legitimate. That distinction is earned when, and only when, 
the process that produces the sentence has succeeded in realizing 
Eighth Amendment norms to their fullest potential. If the sentencer 
imposes the death penalty in the absence of an identifiable safeguard 
which would enhance capital punishment's moral appropriateness, ra-
tional orderliness, or procedural fairness, the sentence lacks legitimacy 
and the execution may not proceed. The failure to provide that safe-
guard might be politically or economically justifiable, might even rep-
resent a prudent accommodation under all the circumstances, but the 
death penalty's constitutional legitimacy is not a shorthand label for a 
"reasonable" or even an "optimal" compromise. Legitimacy results 
from society's best efforts to fulfill the Eighth Amendment's normative 
vision, not efforts that might pass as good enough for government 
work. As such, capital punishment finds itself in a state of constitu-
tional probation - its existence never guaranteed; its legitimacy never 
firmly and unalterably established, but always open to reexamination. 
Third and finally, note the approach's institutional ramifications. 
The approach candidly accepts a strong federal judicial presence in the 
capital punishment sphere as a necessary and appropriate incident to 
responsible constitutional administration. The states, of course, surely 
cannot and should not be wholly displaced. They retain primary au-
thority to fashion and operate the systems by which they sentence 
criminals to death and move such cases to the :finality of execution. 
They also face an obligation to construct carefully and administer con-
scientiously their systems with fealty to the Eighth Amendment's nor-
mative vision, a duty which our federalist ideals naturally lead us to 
hope they will discharge willingly and effectively. But whenever capi-
tal punishment issues reach the Court - and they do and will, in 
many shapes and many ways - the principle of maximum enforce-
ment will dictate the Court's response. The case before the Justices 
might draw into question any aspect of capital practice - the defini-
to claims that the proposed regulation at issue would be of dubious value in contributing to 
greater enforcement of Eighth Amendment norms, that it might conflict with other legitimate 
interests of an individual defendant, that it would pose demonstrable practical problems, or that 
it would take the Court's regulatory efforts into uncharted or unconventional realms. Compare 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.,joined by Blackmun and 
Stevens, JJ.) (declining to hold that a third party has standing to assert that the Constitution 
forbids another capitally sentenced individual from waiving appellate review) with Whitmore, 
495 U.S. at 166-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.) (arguing contra); compare 
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (per Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J.) (upholding con-
stitutionality of jury's use of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances) with Zant, 462 U.S. at 
904-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.) (arguing contra). 
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tion of the capital offense, 107 the aggravating factors that make an of-
fender death-eligible, 108 the method by which the condemned few are 
drawn from the larger group of death-eligible offenders, 109 the alloca-
tion of sentencing authority, 110 pretrial matters, m jury selection, 112 
the conduct of the trial, 113 the quality of state appellate114 or collateral 
review, 115 or the rules that will govern federal review of death cases 
pursuant to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction116 or the fed-
eral judiciary's habeas jurisdiction.117 But the overriding question, at 
bottom, remains the same for the Court: Is the safeguard the defend-
ant seeks one within society's ability to provide, and might it reason-
ably contribute to greater realization of Eighth Amendment norms? 
107. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 255-58 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(arguing against use of elements of underlying offense as aggravating circumstances). 
108. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 784-804 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (con-
tending that Arizona's "especially heinous •.. or depraved" aggravating circumstance is too 
vague to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants meaningfully). 
109. See, e.g., Mccleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320-45 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(contending that statistical proof is sufficient to demonstrate that race plays an unconstitutional 
role in the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia). 
110. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 699-708 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(questioning the validity of an appellate court determining sentence by reweighing of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 762-74 (1990) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing similarly); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 
447, 467-90 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that judicial 
imposition of capital sentence is morally inappropriate; demanding jury sentencing). 
111. See, e.g., Neelley v. Alabama, 488 U.S. 1020, 1020-22 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (arguing for a broader constitutional right to discovery of mitigating 
evidence). 
112. See, e.g .. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1909-17 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(arguing for a constitutional right to broader voir dire of prospective jurors in light of pretrial 
publicity); Lockhart v. Mccree, 476 U.S. 162, 184-206 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that "death-qualified" juries offend "logic, fairness, and the Constitution"). 
113. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2625-31 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing for the exclusion of victim-impact evidence); Sharp v. Texas, 488 U.S. 872, 873 (1988) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (suggesting that evidence of prior unadjudi-
cated criminal conduct is insufficiently reliable to be considered in capital sentencing); Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 188-200, 205-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (seeking more 
stringent limitations on prosecutorial argument); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1015-28 
(1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (contending that instructions regarding the possibility that exec-
utive may commute a life sentence without parole are unconstitutional). 
114. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 166-81 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(contending that capitally sentenced individual should not be able to waive appellate review); 
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 59-74 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (demanding comparative 
proportionality review of capital sentences). 
115. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 15-32 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (con-
tending that death row inmates must be provided with counsel for postconviction proceedings). 
116. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 784-804 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that state supreme court's determination that aggravating circumstance existed should not be 
entitled to respect in federal habeas if factual basis for that finding is in doubt). 
117. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2525-30 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(contending that the Court should not import "actual innocence" standard into habeas petitions 
questioning capital sentencing). 
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B. Legitimacy and the Judicial Restraint School: Bringing 
Structural and Institutional Concerns into the Balance 
1669 
What alternative exists for the Justice who hears the Eighth 
Amendment's normative messages and admits the judiciary's responsi-
bility to enforce them at least occasionally? Predictably, it is the very 
thing the liberal interpretation of Furman's mission strives so hard to 
avoid: a less categorical, issue-by-issue approach to the implementa-
tion of Eighth Amendment norms that enables the Court to strike 
finer balances between the recognized need for judicial enforcement 
and the institutional and structural considerations that argue for judi-
cial restraint. In the areas of equal protection and substantive due 
process, it is called "middle-tier," "intermediate," or "heightened" 
scrutiny - a loosely structured form of balancing, flexible enough to 
permit some accommodation of the interests that militate against the 
fullest conceivable enforcement of the norms of individual liberty. 118 
A solid majority of the Justices now employs just such a methodology 
in conducting its capital punishment business. 
I do not wish to say that the Court has formally embraced balanc-
ing in the death cases. Far from it. The Court has not yet elevated 
balancing to the status of a "standard" or "test" of Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, and you will search in vain for any explicit, une-
quivocal use of the methodology in the opinions. Nonetheless, one can 
make a strong case that the balancing methodology is busily at work 
just beneath the surface of the cases, its operation only thinly masked 
by the compact, precedent-bound analyses that often make up the ve-
neer of death penalty opinions these days. 
1. The Allure of Balancing 
Consider, first, some general observations about the Court and the 
traditions of constitutional criminal adjudication. Were we all forced 
to bet, blind to the details of capital punishment law, on what kind of 
methodology most of the Justices now use to implement constitutional 
values in such cases, the smart money certainly would rest on issue-
specific balancing. The majority of the Court today consists of self-
118. See Aleinikoff, supra note 104, at 968-71 (discussing intermediate scrutiny under the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a form of balancing); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme 
Court, 1991 Term -Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 61 
(1992). 
As Aleinikoff explains, balancing can take two forms. The first calls upon the court to deter-
mine which of two competing principles is most important and, metaphorically speaking, decide 
the case in accordance with which way the scales tip. The second form of balancing - and the 
one on which I am focusing - calls upon the court to strike a balance between competing 
interests, fashioning a rule that accounts for each interest to the extent of its relative weight. 
Aleinikoff, supra note 104, at 946-47. 
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styled moderates or conservatives, 119 precisely the kind of jurists for 
whom such balancing ought to have strong appeal. Those who es-
pouse "judicial restraint" in the 1990s need the power to strike bal-
ances as they go about determining how to implement the 
Constitution's norms of individual liberty. For even when they relish 
those principles of liberty and sincerely desire to see them better real-
ized in practice, Justices of this sort nonetheless will blanch at the 
thought of maximum enforcement. Other values near and dear to 
their hearts - in particular, those political values that give rise to the 
structural and institutional postulates of our constitutional order -
stand to be sold short by any one-sided, rights-dominant approach to 
the Court's role in implementing norms.12° Considerations of govern-
mental structure and institutional responsibility carry sufficient consti-
tutional weight to require that the Justices accommodate them, to the 
extent possible within the bounds of principled judgment, in the course 
of resolving enforcement questions. The task demands a roomier 
methodology, and a balancing approach fits the bill perfectly. If bal-
ancing's appeal holds in the case of the more comfortably settled prin-
ciples of individual liberty, like those found in the First 
Amendment, 121 then it surely prevails in the case of the less firmly 
rooted, more controversial norms that depend heavily on stare decisis 
for their constitutional security, like a woman's unenumerated right to 
control her reproductive affairs. 122 The pressures that build up in con-
stitutional adjudication must escape somewhere, and flexibility on the 
enforcement side of the ledger permits them to be vented off with min-
imum damage to the Constitution's core normative content. 
Alluring as a general proposition, 123 balancing would seem to cut 
119. I doubt that readers of this article require authority to support this proposition, but 
those in search of a good general account of the Rehnquist Court's rightward leanings might 
wish to consult DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST 
SUPREME COURT (1992). 
120. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Federalism As a Fundamental Value: National League of 
Cities in Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 81, 108-09. 
121. As Aleinikoff details, balancing analyses have spread across the constitutional landscape 
"like wild clover." Aleinikoff, supra note 104, at 963-972 (cataloguing doctrinal areas in which 
Court has adopted balancing methodology). 
122. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803-33 (1992) (joint opinion of 
O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (accepting the constitutional nature of women's privacy inter-
est with respect to abortion for reasons of stare decisis, but agreeing to enforce that interest only 
pursuant to a standard of intermediate scrutiny). 
123. As Kathleen Sullivan has demonstrated, the prominence of balancing is clearly evident 
in much of the Supreme Court's recent work. Sullivan attributes the unexpected moderation 
displayed by the Court during the 1991 Tenn to the adoption of balancing by a newly formed 
coalition of Justices. Sullivan, supra note 118. Sullivan notes that in five key areas - abortion 
rights, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, takings, and federalism - Reagan and Bush ap-
pointees to the Court have "split not only on results but on methods - on the forms that the vast 
grid of doctrines, tests, and formulas comprising constitutional law should take. They split over 
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an especially attractive figure for the Justices in the area of capital 
punishment. The death penalty is, after all, a predominantly state law 
phenomenon, 124 administered in different ways by different jurisdic-
tions with different perceived needs and different views on some of the 
most sharply controverted philosophical and practical issues associ-
ated with crime and punishment. It is, indeed, the quintessential exer-
cise of criminal law authority that our system of government has 
traditionally held to reside foremost with the states. As any student of 
constitutional criminal procedure should know, the Supreme Court 
has always been especially mindful of the structural claims of federal-
ism and the institutional ramifications of using federal judicial power 
when determining its role in bringing the Constitution's norms to bear 
upon state criminal law. In no other area, moreover, has the Court so 
consistently turned to balancing - sometimes explicitly, other times 
less openly - to oblige those concerns in the decisional process. 
When the Court has implemented constitutional liberties in the realm 
of state criminal law, measured accommodation at the case-specific or 
issue-specific level - not strict scrutiny, not maximum enforcement 
- has been the name of the game.12s 
Although balancing is by no means uncontroversial, 126 there is no 
doubt that the current Court appreciates its prominence in constitu-
the choice of rules or standards - over whether to cast legal directives in more or less discretion-
ary form." Id. at 26. Directly likening this contemporary rift to the one between Justices Black 
and Frankfurter a generation ago, id., Sullivan concludes that the more flexible balancing ap-
proach is prevailing because the center of the Court - Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter 
- favors it. Id. at 122-23. 
124. Capital punishment was reinstated for a relatively narrow category of federal crimes in 
1988. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(e)(l)(A) (1988) (providing for death penalty in cases of so-called 
"drug kingpins" who intentionally kill while engaged in criminal activity). 
125. In the years before the Warren Court selectively incorporated most provisions of the 
Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause, the Court openly balanced these countervailing con-
siderations against the normative implications of a challenged state criminal practice on an issue-
specific basis under the rubric of "fundamental fairness." See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, The 
Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 220-
21, 252-55 (1959). Ad hoc balancing took a brief hiatus in the 1960s while the Warren Court 
pursued its selective incorporation agenda. Employing a global balancing approach, the Court 
concluded that the interests of federalism were not as a general rule sufficiently weighty to mili-
tate against categorically extending the chief criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights 
to the states pursuant to the Due Process Clause. But as soon as selective incorporation was 
accomplished and attention once again turned to the disposition of concrete cases and the articu-
lation of doctrine, more particularized issue-specific balancing returned. See Jerold H. Israel, 
Foreword: Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 325-26 (1982). 
126. Balancing certainly has its critics. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 104, at 972-95; Lau-
rent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law? -A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. 
REV. 729, 744-53 (1963); Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 
1424, 1440-49 (1962); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The 
Jurisprodence of Justice Powel/, 91 YALE L.J. 1, 47-59 (1987). However, even balancing's most 
determined foes must concede that the methodology has "become widespread, if not dominant, 
over the last four decades." Aleinikoff, supra note 104, at 943-44. 
For a defense of balancing from one of its most noted advocates, see Justice Frankfurter's 
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tional criminal adjudication over the years and identifies with the con-
cerns that prompt judges to balance.127 Those considerations can be 
characterized in varying ways, but they fall naturally into three gen-
eral categories. First, there are concerns that excessive use of the fed-
eral judicial power may undermine the autonomy of the states that 
federalism envisions. The point is not that the states are "sovereigns" 
entitled to the respect customarily due to those who hold fundamental 
political power, although more than a few "state's rights" arguments 
have been pitched to that mistaken note. 128 In our nation, sovereignty 
resides firmly with the People. 129 However, strong, independent states 
- states with healthy governmental and political institutions - can 
provide the People a more accessible government, the promise of a 
more participatory political life,130 and the means to checkt3t and in-
fiuence132 the use of the national power. 
Second, there are concerns that too heavy a federal judicial hand 
might frustrate the search for better, more enduring solutions to soci-
ety's problems. As Justice Brandeis eloquently explained some sixty 
years ago, state experiments can contribute mightily to the resolution 
of social problems "without risk to the rest of the country" and should 
therefore not be discouraged lightly.133 Federal courts, furthermore, 
opinions in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-72 (1952). 
127. See Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2576-77 (1992) (emphasizing that interpreta-
tion of Due Process Clause in cases involving criminal process must show deference to the "con-
siderable expertise" of the states, "considered legislative judgments" in that regard, and "the 
careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order"); Martin v. Ohio, 480 
U.S. 228, 232 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977). 
128. Of course, Southern politicians who resisted the U.S. Supreme Court's desegregation 
decisions were particularly fond of the hard-line "state's rights" argument. See, e.g., JACK BASS, 
UNLIKELY HEROES 117-18, 128-35, 182-85 (1981) (discussing Southern political leaders' invoca-
tion of the interposition doctrine); MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN 
ORDER 47, 63 (1987) (discussing "state's rights" political discourse during desegregation). 
129. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 216-18 (1991); 
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1429-66 (1987). 
130. See, e.g., Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Fed-
eralism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. Cr. REV. 341, 395-408. 
131. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 129, at 1504-19 (explaining how state institutions can pro-
vide remedies against unconstitutional action by federal officials). 
132. See, e.g., Rapaczynski, supra note 130, at 386-91 (explaining how groups can organize 
at the state level in order to attempt to influence policy at the federal level); Herbert Wechsler, 
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of 
the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 543, 546-58 (1954) (discussing influence of states 
on organs of national power). 
133. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Justice Brandeis' full statement reads as follows: 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial 
of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one 
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
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do not hold the patent on wisdom, and their distance from the fray -
advantageous for some purposes - can impede their ability to grasp 
fully the diverse needs, problems, and limitations each state faces. 134 
Third and lastly, there are concerns that the federal courts may 
debase their own legitimacy or exhaust their own limited resources. 
When the federal judiciary wields its power in state criminal cases too 
casually, it may cross the fine line that separates sound, well-grounded 
implementation of constitutional values from highly consuming, insuf-
ficiently productive, unduly subjective, or needlessly abrasive "judicial 
activism."135 
In the eyes of a believer in judicial restraint, use of the federal judi-
cial power to regulate state capital cases could seriously implicate all 
three of the foregoing concerns. States that employ the death penalty 
have made a choice that the Constitution permits and their political 
processes have mandated. The states cannot pursue their objective in 
a completely unfettered manner; they must abide by constitutional val-
ues as they carry out their policies, and the federal judiciary has an 
important part to play in ensuring that they do so. But, at some point 
along the imaginary graph that charts federal judicial involvement -
as the Court imposes increasingly rigid constitutional rules upon the 
states, or heightens federal judicial scrutiny of state criminal prosecu-
tions on direct or collateral review - the structural frictions and insti-
tutional frustrations attain critical mass. The states suffer a symbolic 
blow to their power to govern, their ability to advance perceived needs 
and their willingness to experiment to that end are both undercut, and 
the Court - held to blame for these untoward consequences along 
with the general dissatisfaction its behavior has engendered in the fed-
eral system - experiences a diminution in respect and, this theory 
holds, in its capacity to lead.136 Jurists schooled in the virtues of judi-
the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike 
down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is 
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable .... But in the exercise of this high power, we must be 
ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by 
the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold. 
285 U.S. at 311 (footnote omitted). 
134. See, e.g., Israel, supra note 125, at 317. 
135. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 404-05 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 461-65 (Powell, J., dissenting); 408 U.S. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 249-50 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting in part and con-
curring in part); see also Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren 
Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 526, 538 (suggesting that these concerns 
ultimately worked to dampen the Warren Court's own activist inclinations). 
136. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 465-70 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing Justice Rehnquist's dissent 
in Furman and arguing that federalism concerns dictate caution when passing on questions of 
crime and punishment). 
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cial restraint - that is to say, most of the Justices now sitting on the 
Supreme Court - surely will not disregard these possibilities as they 
seek to implement the Eighth Amendment today. It is entirely reason-
able to expect that they would reserve the right to moderate their use 
of the federal judicial power, employing it when the anticipated bene-
fits seem to justify the costs. 137 
2. Balancing's Prevalence in Capital Punishment 
Jurisprudence Today 
Examining the Court's recent death cases with these background 
observations in mind, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that balanc-
ing has triumphed as the methodology of choice for resolving Eighth 
Amendment enforcement questions. Why balancing's victory has not 
been formally declared - why the Justices strike their accommoda-
tions between Eighth Amendment norms and countervailing interests 
behind closed doors - remains a mystery and a potentially fertile 
ground for those who like to speculate on the ways of the Court. But 
the signs of its ascension are there for willing eyes to see. 
The Court's rhetoric is certainly indicative of balancing's presence. 
Recent death penalty opinions frequently recognize that there are es-
tablished Eighth Amendment norms that, due to the death penalty's 
unique severity and irrevocability, the Court must protect and enforce 
through constitutional rules and judicial review. 138 But the discussion 
rarely stops there. The opinions also express concern and respect for 
state autonomy, 139 the virtues of state experimentation, 140 and the 
need to preserve the institutional integrity of the federal courts141 -
137. Nor, it might be noted, would a Justice have difficulty defending a willingness to accom· 
modate matters of governmental structure and institutional responsibility as consistent with the 
spirit of Furman. Furman itself may easily be conceptualized as a decision aimed primarily at 
stimulating state institutions to revisit capital punishment and to assume the responsibility to 
regulate it more conscientiously. See, e.g., Bilionis, supra note 3, at 331 n.156. 
138. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2519-21 (1992); Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. 
Ct. 2222, 2233-34 (1992); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (plurality opinion); 
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1988). 
139. The state autonomy theme figures prominently in cases dealing with the scope of federal 
habeas review in death cases, and the Court's habeas reforms admittedly are inspired by a felt 
need to accommodate the concerns of federalism. See, e.g., Mccleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 
1469 (1991) (deploying the federal judicial power to review collaterally the final judgments of 
state courts "frustrate[s] ... 'both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good· 
faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.' . . . Our federal system recognizes the independent 
power of a State to articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the power of a State to 
pass laws means little if the State cannot enforce them.'') (citations omitted). The desire to pre· 
serve state autonomy also surfaces, however, in opinions directly concerned with the proper 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652-56 
(1990); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990). 
140. E.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991). 
141. E.g., Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 914-15 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Booth 
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precisely those restraining structural and institutional values that the 
Court dwells upon when it employs a balancing methodology, and 
whose relevance to the constitutional analysis is otherwise hard to 
fathom. With all of balancing's requisite ingredients so neatly laid out 
on the countertop, it is a fair inference that the Court is following the 
recipe. 
Some opinions, moreover, smack so heavily of balancing as to defy 
explanation on any other methodological ground. Justice O'Connor's 
remarkable concurrence in Thompson v. Oklahoma 142 springs immedi-
ately to mind, as does Justice Kennedy's cautious opinion concurring 
in the judgment in Murray v. Giarratano. 143 But the most vivid exam-
ple is Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Payne v. Ten-
nessee. 144 At issue was the prohibition against victim-impact evidence 
in capital sentencing proceedings established in Booth v. Maryland. 145 
Defending Booth, the condemned inmate stressed how its exclusionary 
rule helps ensure that sentencers remain focused upon the individual 
v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Payne, 111 S. 
Ct. 2597 (1991); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 467-68 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Zimring, supra note 68, at 
15 (arguing that the Court is moved by "the self-protective intention to insulate the federal courts 
from the hostility and damage that active involvement in capital cases has generated"). 
142. 487 U.S. 815, 848-59 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). The case con-
cerned the constitutionality of the death penalty for juveniles under the age of 16. Justice 
O'Connor conceded that the case for holding the penalty unconstitutionally disproportionate in 
such cases - in other words, banning the penalty in such cases on a per se basis - had its 
strengths. Preferring not to substitute the Court's "inevitably subjective judgment ... for the 
judgments of the Nation's legislatures" on the question, however, Justice O'Connor sought an 
intermediate point of accommodation between the interests of the juvenile and the interests of 
federalism. See 487 U.S. at 854. She would not ascribe to the state legislature an intention to 
make juveniles under the age of 16 eligible for the death penalty and therefore would not reach 
the ultimate constitutional question, in the absence of clear evidence that the legislature forth-
rightly confronted the issue and explicitly opted in favor of eligibility. Her resolution was admit-
tedly "unusual," but commendable because it protects the defendant's Eighth Amendment 
interests, 487 U.S. at 858 n.*, at the same time that it "allows the ultimate moral issue at stake in 
the constitutional question to be addressed in the first instance by those best suited to do so, the 
people's elected representatives." 487 U.S. at 858-59. 
143. 492 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989) (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
The case raised the question whether death row inmates are constitutionally entitled to the ap-
pointment of counsel to assist them in pursuing collateral review in state or federal court. Justice 
Kennedy acknowledged the constitutional nature of the inmates' interest, pointing to the impor-
tance of collateral review for prisoners sentenced to death and their dependence upon legal assist-
ance to meaningfully utilize the procedures made available. Like Justice O'Connor in Thompson, 
Justice Kennedy sought an intermediate point between full enforcement and no enforcement at 
all, a resolution that would accommodate institutional and structural interests while affording 
some protection for the inmates' constitutional interest. He accomplished that by carefully link-
ing his concurrence in the judgment to the fact that the Virginia death row inmates involved in 
fact were receiving legal assistance from various sources. 492 U.S. at 14-15. 
144. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). 
145. 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled in part by Payne, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). The Court 
applied Booth to prosecutorial argument in South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), 
overruled by Payne, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). 
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circumstances of the offense and the characteristics of the offender, 
rather than upon potentially invidious considerations relating to the 
victim's race or station in society. 146 Interestingly, the Chief Justice 
did not deny that Booth aimed to advance legitimate Eighth Amend-
ment values by promoting capital sentencing's moral appropriateness 
and its rational orderliness. Booth's salient shortcoming, according to 
the Chief Justice, was its unaccommodating rigidity. In its zeal to en-
force Eighth Amendment norms, Booth took the risks associated with 
victim-impact evidence too seriously147 and the states' interest in using 
such evidence too lightly. The harm done by an offender often figures 
prominently in sentencing policy, and states might reasonably believe 
that for a capital sentencer "to assess meaningfully the defendant's 
moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the 
sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defend-
ant." 148 A proper respect for federalism principles, the Chief Justice 
insisted, requires that the Court afford the states some latitude to ex-
periment in the area: 
Under our constitutional system, the primary responsibility for defin-
ing crimes against state law, fixing punishments for the commission of 
these crimes, and establishing procedures for criminal trials rests with 
the States. The state laws respecting crimes, punishments, and criminal 
procedure are of course subject to the overriding provisions of the 
United States Constitution. Where the State imposes the death penalty 
for a particular crime, we have held that the Eighth Amendment im-
poses special limitations upon that process .... But, as we noted in Cali-
fornia v. Ramos, "[b]eyond these limitations ... the Court has deferred 
to the State's choice of substantive factors relevant to the penalty 
determination." 
"Within the constitutional limitations defined by our cases, the States 
enjoy their traditional latitude to prescribe the method by which those 
who commit murder should be punished." Blystone v. Pennsylvania. 
The States remain free, in capital cases, as well as others, to devise new 
procedures and new remedies to meet felt needs. 149 
Booth's per se bar against victim-impact evidence simply struck an un-
146. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607. 
147. The Chief Justice went to great pains to argue that the risk that victim-impact evidence 
might distract the sentencer from its constitutional mission is more apparent than real. Payne, 
111 S. Ct. at 2607. 
148. 111 S. Ct. at 2608. The Chief Justice's opinion in Payne made nothing of the fact that 
Booth struck a controversial symbolic blow to the "victim rights" reform movement, though the 
fact surely crossed the Court's mind. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring) (not-
ing that Booth's holding "conflicts with a public sense of justice keen enough that it has found 
voice in a nationwide 'victim's rights' movement"); see also Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting the same). 
149. Payne, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2607-08 (1991) (citations to Ramos and Blystone omitted). The 
Chief Justice was quoting his own words for the Court in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 
309 (1990). 
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acceptable ba1ance for the Court. The Court held a capita] defendant's 
constitutiona1 interests would be protected by a less intrusive, more 
flexible case-by-case review.1so 
More broadly, ba1ancing revea1s itself in the shape of the Court's 
capita] jurisprudence as a whole. No other constitutiona1 methodol-
ogy so cleanly and convincingly explains and reconciles the seemingly 
divergent strains of current death pena1ty law that have led the most 
studious observers to wonder whether there is rhyme or reason to the 
Court's efforts. 
When capita] defendants have won in the High Court - as noted 
earlier, they have secured some important victories in recent years151 
- they have asked for no more than what a reasoned and principled 
ba1ancing of the interests would deem just and right. Reflecting upon 
those cases revea1s that three conditions invariably have been present: 
1. The Court identified an appreciable risk that at least one of the 
Eighth Amendment's central norms was not being realized in practice; 
2. The Court could eliminate or minimize the risk by imposing a con-
stitutional rule upon the states or by authorizing the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction to scrutinize the work of the state; and 
3. The Court had little reason to fear that its effort to eliminate or min-
imize the risk would do real violence to the structural and institutional 
values that generally counsel restraint. 152 
150. "In the majority of cases, and in this case, victim impact evidence serves entirely legiti-
mate purposes. In the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it 
renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides a mechanism for relief." Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608. 
It is doubtless true that the Due Process Clause could guard against the evils associated with 
victim-impact evidence, and capital defendants are justified in reading Payne as a promise the 
Court has made and must keep. But do not fault those who have represented capital defendants 
if they regard this portion of the Payne opinion with skepticism. They have seen firsthand how 
much havoc to Eighth Amendment values can be wrought without violating the Due Process 
Clause's sense of "fundamental fairness." See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 178-87 
(1986); Darden, 477 U.S. at 188-206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
151. See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992); Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926 
(1992); Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992); Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992); 
Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992); Lankford v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991); Parker v. 
Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731 (1991); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). For discussion of 
these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 77, 82-88, 90. 
152. The decision in Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), provides the clearest illustra-
tion. The Court there held that capital defendants are constitutionally entitled to a particular-
ized voir dire of prospective jurors to facilitate their right to remove for cause any "juror who 
will automatically vote for the death penalty [and thus] will fail in good faith to consider the 
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require." Morgan, 112 
S. Ct. at 2229. The ruling has obvious importance for the protection of a defendant's Eighth 
Amendment interest in obtaining a meaningful individualized determination of the morally ap-
propriate sentence. Moreover, and as the Court recognized, the states are hardly in a position to 
lament the ruling as substantially burdensome. After all, the states already provide extensive 
jury voir dire/or the prosecution's benefit to root out those jurors whose opposition to the death 
penalty makes them excludable for cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2232-33. 
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It is hardly surprising that the cases in which capital defendants have 
succeeded fit this description. When these three conditions exist, even 
card-carrying members of the judicial restraint school would agree 
that the balance favors judicial action. The case for restraint comes 
nowhere close to outweighing the case for enforcing Eighth Amend-
ment values. 
When the states have prevailed, the more frequent result these 
days, 153 the conditions - as perceived by the Justices, at least - have 
been quite different. A survey of those decisions reveals that they meet 
one of the following descriptions: 
1. The defendant asked for a constitutional rule to govern the capital 
trial that the Court regarded as stricter than necessary to protect the 
defendant's Eighth Amendment interests and unduly restrictive of the 
states' power to fashion their own procedures and to respond to local 
needs; 154 or 
2. The defendant asked that a feature of the state's capital sentencing 
system be tested not facially, and not as applied to him, but as applied in 
the run of cases - an approach objectionable to the states because it 
renders them helpless to structure a system that they know with cer-
tainty will pass muster and because it places the federal judiciary in an 
especially scrutinizing oversight role;l55 or 
3. The state asked for flexibility in dealing with constitutional errors in 
capital sentencing, seeking permission to employ, at its option, a tech-
nique to remedy prejudicial errors (appellate reweighing) or to excuse 
inconsequential ones (harmless error analysis); either of these tech-
niques, when conscientiously applied, might in theory respect an ac-
cused's substantial constitutional interests while preserving state 
resources;156 or 
4. The defendant asked the Court to authorize the use of federal habeas 
corpus jurisdiction to review a question already reached and resolved by 
the state courts in good faith on state or federal grounds or on a fairly 
supported determination of the facts then presented;157 or 
5. The defendant asked the Court to authorize the use of habeas to 
review a death sentence more than once.158 
Small wonder that death row's disappointments in the Supreme Court 
153. See cases cited supra notes 19, 28-35, 39-40, 43-46, 51-52, 54-57 and accompanying 
text. 
154. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991); 
Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991); Saffie v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Boyde v. Califor-
nia, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
155. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990); Walton v. 
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
156. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990); see also Walton, 491 U.S. at 652-56. 
157. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993); Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993); 
Coleman v. Thompson, Ill S. Ct. 2546 (1991); Saffie v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); see also 
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
158. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 856-70; Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992); McCleskey v. 
Zant, lll S. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
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conform to this pattern, for it is the result one would expect from 
moderate and conservative jurists who measure their role in capital 
punishment by balancing the competing interests at stake. In each 
instance, the structural and institutional costs of a ruling for the de-
fendant can easily be accented enough to cause a judicial restraint 
sympathizer to pause. And in each instance, the marginal contribu-
tion that a ruling for the defendant might make to the realization of 
Eighth Amendment values can be depreciated enough to permit that 
same Justice to find against the defendant without suffering sharp 
pangs of guilt. After all, the Justice can reason, in none of the forego-
ing situations would a ruling for the state leave capital defendants be-
reft of a federally mandated safeguard designed to protect, at least in 
part, the constitutional interests at stake, nor would a ruling for the 
state permit any defendant to complain that he was never afforded an 
opportunity to seek the benefit of that safeguard.159 The issue in these 
cases is whether capital defendants should receive more protective 
rules and broader opportunities to call upon those rules. Granting 
them these benefits might concededly enhance the death penalty's le-
gitimacy - but not appreciably enough, in the estimation of a moder-
ate or conservative Justice, to justify the sacrifice of federalism values 
and the expenditure of federal judicial capital that such a step would 
entail. 
Finally, balancing permits us to unravel, as no other methodology 
can, the riddles many observers find latent in the Court's capital juris-
prudence. Why is it that the Court extols the Eighth Amendment's 
normative vision on one day, going so far as to dismiss criticism of 
that vision as "jaundiced,"160 yet seems reticent to fulfill that vision on 
another day? Why do some shortcomings in capital sentencing inspire 
elaborate regulatory responses from the Court when even more troub-
ling examples of illegitimacy elicit nothing more than a shrug of the 
159. This point would not be true when the only safeguard available for the defendant is one 
that did not exist until the defendant's conviction and sentence were final, and where neither the 
state nor federal courts are willing to apply the safeguard retroactively and excuse the defend-
ant's failure to have sought and obtained recognition of the safeguard earlier. Query whether the 
Court would readily admit that one of its "new rules" lacked an antecedent upon which earlier 
defendants could have relied for some protection against the evil at issue - such as the Due 
Process Clause's ever-existing guarantee of "fundamental fairness." Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 
S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991) (suggesting that the protection which had been afforded by Booth v. 
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), merely amplified preexisting due process protections); Sawyer v. 
Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 236 (1990) (suggesting that the protection afforded by Caldwell v. Missis-
sippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), augments preexisting due process protections). Query, too, whether a 
truly new constitutional rule relating to capital sentencing, lacking any less-protective antecedent 
whatsoever, could fail to qualify as a novel claim for which procedural defaults may be excused 
under Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984), and as a rule calling for retroactive application under one 
of the exceptions recognized by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
160. See Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2233 (1992). 
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Court's shoulders?161 Why, in short, is death penalty law in the Court 
so tentative, so contingent? 
The answer is obvious once we appreciate balancing's role in capi-
tal cases. Simply put, the Court is striving to promote competing 
objectives. The Justices who now make up the Court recognize the 
Eighth Amendment's well-grounded values162 and, all things being 
equal, stand willing to contribute to their better realization and 
thereby make capital punishment more legitimate in practice. 163 But 
the Justices in the current majority also place great weight on the 
structural and institutional values embodied in the Constitution -
much more weight than jurists like Brennan or Marshall might assign 
such immediately impersonal considerations but, in fairness, maybe no 
more than jurists like Frankfurter or Harlan would. They want to 
reduce the presence of the federal judiciary in what are fundamentally 
state cases of intensely state concern, and thus they expect to reap the 
perceived benefits of judicial restraint: rekindled respect for state self-
governance, renewed confidence in state institutions, rejuvenation of 
the role of the states in the federal system, and conservation of limited 
federal judicial resources. 164 
Not even the most inventive Court could fully accomplish these 
objectives simultaneously. Accommodations have to be made, bal-
161. Compare Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2122-23 (1992); Stringer v. Black, 112 S. 
Ct. 1130, 1135-40 (1992); Parker v. Dugger, Ill S. Ct. 731, 735-40 (1991); Clemons v. Missis-
sippi, 494 U.S. 738, 744-54 (1990) with McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306-20 (1987). 
162. As noted earlier, an exception must be recognized for Justice Scalia's opposition to the 
values underlying Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 586 (1978). See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
163. If not, they by now would have abandoned any pretense of regulation or, lacking the 
courage to do that, at least would have found ways to rule differently in cases like Morgan, 112 S. 
Ct. at 2228-35; Sochor, 112 S. Ct. at 2119-23; Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1134-40; and Parker, 111 S. 
Ct. at 735-40. 
164. It is easier to subscribe to this position if you believe that state courts - the institutions 
which in practice make most of the important decisions relating to the administration of capital 
punishment at the state level - are not hostile to constitutional norms and can be trusted to give 
them a fair accounting. Members of the Court have professed that faith. See, e.g., Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (1993); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Moore v. 
Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976); Huffman v. 
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975); Sandra Day O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Be-
tween the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 801, 813-14 (1981). The issue has generated much inquiry in the scholarly community. 
See generally Amar, supra note 129; Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 11 
B.U. L. REV. 645 (1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593 
(1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 
UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651 (1991); 
Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); Michael E. Solimine & 
James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of 
Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 213 (1983); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: 
The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609 
(1991). 
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ances must be struck. The resulting jurisprudence will inevitably par-
take of tentativeness and contingency. In some circumstances, the 
Court will underenforce Eighth Amendment norms because structural 
or institutional values dominate at the margin, whereas, in other in-
stances, the contrary will be the case. The rules that emerge from 
these situation-specific balancings will not assure capital punishment's 
legitimacy because they were never formulated with that single-
minded intention. What they express - and all that they express - is 
the role the Court is willing to play in promoting Eighth Amendment 
norms, a role encumbered and restrained by competing objectives. 
Brennan and Marshall's Furman, if it ever lived outside the hopes 
and dreams of capital punishment's confirmed critics, has for the time 
being lost out to a different conception of the Court's role in legitimat-
ing the death penalty. The Eighth Amendment itself lives on, its 
norms still vital and still claiming the Court's attention. But that at-
tention is divided, the federal judicial commitment tempered in defer-
ence to other values. Some will say this is what Furman called for all 
along; 165 others will swear by Brennan and Marshall's interpretation. 
In a very real sense, both views are right and wrong - right because 
each is consistent with Furman and its 1976 progeny, and wrong be-
cause neither view triumphed over the other in those cases. The deci-
sions, it should be remembered, were rendered by a divided Court that 
did not settle upon a single vision in a single opinion.166 
What the Furman project meant at its genesis will never be re-
solved. What it means for the Court's current majority is balancing. 
III. BALANCING'S IMPLICATIONS: IMPLEMENTING 
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES AT THE STATE LEVEL 
Readers who are familiar with the scholarship and commentary 
surrounding capital punishment jurisprudence should appreciate the 
descriptive significance of the framework outlined above. As noted 
earlier, the journals regularly carry pieces excoriating the Court's deci-
sions - particularly those which reject the claims of a death row in-
mate - and ruminating about the apparent demise of the Eighth 
Amendment. They frequently feature creative projects - many of 
which are quite good - that seek to locate death penalty law within a 
165. Those wishing to make that case might begin by pointing to the fact that during the 
formative post-Furman years, Justice Lewis Powell's pivotal swing vote often dictated the result 
in death cases and therefore shaped the course of the law. As Paul Kahn has demonstrated, 
balancing dominated Justice Powell's jurisprudence. Kahn, supra note 126. 
166. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 5, at 315-17 (describing Furman as "a badly orchestrated 
opera, with nine characters taking turns to offer their own arias"). 
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particular philosophical tradition or to advance some rights-oriented 
theorization about what the Eighth Amendment should, but does not 
now, mean. A few projects even demonstrate that the Court's own 
doctrines establish the death penalty's unconstitutionality, 167 a propo-
sition I am supremely confident the Justices neither intended nor will 
seriously entertain anytime soon. Strange as it might seem, however, 
it is a novel step, out of keeping with the run of death penalty scholar-
ship, to suggest that an intelligible and constitutionally respectable 
methodology actually underlies the Court's Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
As it is, the ideas developed above also have important implica-
tions for how we should discuss and resolve capital punishment issues 
in the future. By understanding capital punishment jurisprudence in 
balancing terms, we can begin to bring into proper focus the roles 
which state constitutional law, judge-made interstitial law, and guber-
natorial clemency should play in the administration of the death pen-
alty today. These alternative sources of regulatory authority have a 
vital constitutional mission to perform in the realization of Eighth 
Amendment norms and the legitimation of capital punishment under 
Furman. 
A. Critical Independent Assessments Under the State Constitution 
Much has been written about the renaissance of state constitu-
tional law, 168 and lawyers everywhere now comprehend that the states 
are free to interpret their own constitutions to grant more rights and 
167. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 18, at 1174-75 ("The death penalty would be invalid not 
because it is per se cruel and unusual, but because it cannot be procedurally implemented in a 
constitutional fashion."); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 18, at 868 ("Furman's failure to fulfill its 
promise of principled, nonarbitrary decisionmaking renders the death penalty unconstitutional"). 
Insofar as these arguments stress the inevitable unpredictability of death sentencing judgments 
produced by a discretionary process, they are reminiscent of the classic case against capital pun-
ishment spelled out by Charles Black. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: 
THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974). 
168. See, e.g., Symposium, The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEXAS L. RBV. 
959 (1985); Symposium, Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1119 
(1992); Symposium, "The Law of the Land": The North Carolina Constitution and State Consti-
tutional Law, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1701 (1992); The 1970 Illinois Constitution in Review: A Sympo-
sium on Issues for Change, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 565 (1988); Symposium on the Revolution in 
State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REv. 11 (1988); Developments in the Law - The Interpreta-
tion of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982); see also HUGO A. BEDAU, 
DEATH Is DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISH• 
MENT 185-94 (1987) (discussing the relative paucity of state constitutional decisions pertaining 
to the death penalty); James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty 
Under State Constitutions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1299, 1301-02 (1989) (setting forth arguments for 
increased state constitutional scrutiny of capital punishment); James A. Gardner, The Failed 
Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 761, 778-94 (1992) (critiquing, with 
skepticism, the revival of state constitutional law). 
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protections to individuals charged with crimes than the federal Consti-
tution requires. Getting a state court to act with constitutional inde-
pendence in a capital case is not, however, an easy feat to accomplish. 
On the one hand, there are craft-related obstacles. Rarely will the lan-
guage used in the relevant state constitutional texts differ from the 
Eighth Amendment in ways material enough to invite, let alone com-
pel, a fundamentally different interpretation; most state provisions 
simply prohibit, as does the Eighth Amendment, the imposition of 
"cruel and unusual punishments."169 Nor is there likely to be much 
precedent directly construing the state constitution that might bring a 
meaning to that text that is substantially broader than the federal. On 
the other hand, entrenched attitudes also conspire to retard the devel-
opment of a state constitutional capital jurisprudence. State judges are 
not by predisposition a leftward leaning lot eager to bestow new rights 
upon murderers, 170 and, in states where the judiciary is elected, some 
portion of the bench is apt to consider it a questionable career move to 
support more protections for killers than the U.S. Supreme Court says 
169. E.g., GA. CoNST. art. I,§ 1, para. 17; TENN. CONST. art. I,§ 16; UTAH CONST. art. I, 
§ 9; see also Acker & Walsh, supra note 168, at 1321 & n.112 (detailing 15 states whose provi-
sions against cruel and unusual punishment are "virtually identical" to the Eighth Amendment). 
Some state clauses, unlike the federal provision, ban cruel or unusual punishments. See, e.g., 
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27. This textual distinction could prove important if the Supreme Court 
ever follows Justice Scalia's lead and attaches controlling significance to the Eighth Amend-
ment's use of the conjunctive "and." See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stressing that punishment must be both cruel 
and unusual before it may be held to violate the Eighth Amendment); Medley v. North Carolina 
Dept. of Correction, 412 S.E.2d 654, 660 (N.C. 1992) (Martin, J., concurring) (suggesting that 
state prohibition against "cruel or unusual punishments" is more protective than the Eighth 
Amendment because the former employs the disjunctive whereas the latter employs the conjunc-
tive); Harry C. Martin, The State as a ''Font of Individual Liberties'~· North Carolina Accepts the 
Challenge, 10 N.C. L. R.Ev. 1749, 1755-56 (1992) (same). 
170. Do not let the excitement surrounding state constitutional law's revival lead you to 
believe otherwise. Insofar as criminal procedure is concerned, the revival is a much less liberal 
phenomenon than either its proponents or its critics would care to admit. Some so-called "break-
throughs" at the state level are distinctly preservationist in nature, recognizing under the state 
charter protections that were just recently removed from the federal catalogue. See, e.g., State v. 
Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988) (preserving exclusionary rule intact on state constitutional 
grounds; rejecting new federal good-faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984)). Many of the remaining state constitutional cases of note involve claims of right that are 
near misses under the Federal Constitution, involving only modest differences of opinion over the 
full doctrinal reach of an uncontroversial principle. See, e.g., State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300, 
1307-11 (Conn. 1992) (defining seizure broadly for state constitutional purposes; rejecting Cali-
fornia v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991)); State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446 (Conn. 1988) 
(granting broader protection to an arrestee's interest in the assistance of counsel in interrogation; 
rejecting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)); State v. Quine, 840 P.2d 358 (Hawaii 1992) 
(reaching same conclusion as Oquendo court); Commonwealth v. Hess, 617 A.2d 307, 311-15 
(Pa. 1992) (granting broader protection to defendant's interest in securing counsel of choice; 
rejecting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989)). For a general 
discussion of the conservatism in state constitutional law, see Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conser-
vatism of the State Court "Revolution," 74 JUDICATURE 190 (1991). 
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they have "a right to."171 In addition to these realistic if fairly crass 
considerations, there also exists a deeply ingrained tendency on the 
part of state jurists to regard the Supreme Court as the definitive ex-
positor of all things constitutional.172 Given the sweeping, intricate 
web of death penalty law already woven by the Justices in Washing-
ton, state judges - mere mortal souls that they are - have trouble 
imagining there might be anything of constitutional magnitude re-
maining for them to contribute. 173 
State jurists who think in this manner have surely overestimated 
the Supreme Court's capital jurisprudence. If the foregoing examina-
tion of balancing's role in capital cases makes nothing else clear, it 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence 
leaves a potentially large constitutional void unfilled. Precisely be-
cause the Court balances, the rules it lays down do not coextend with 
the Eighth Amendment's normative content, do not exhaust the po-
tential of those constitutional values, and do not ensure a normatively 
legitimate system of capital punishment. As Lawrence Sager would 
put it, "what the members of the federal tribunal have actually deter-
mined is that there are good reasons for stopping short of exhausting 
the content of the constitutional concept with which they are dealing," 
leaving in the process an "unenforced margin[ ] of underenforced 
norms."174 This constitutional vacuum exists in the death penalty 
area solely because the Supreme Court finds its own ability to imple-
ment constitutional norms constrained by institutional and structural 
limitations. The problem is the Court's grasp, not the reach of the 
underlying norms. 
Therein lies the key to unleashing the potential of state constitu-
tional law. Nature abhors a vacuum, and so too, in its own way, does 
our national constitutional environment. State constitutions are a 
171. For Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court, such a record of 
prodefendant rulings proved fatal. See Muriel Dobbin, As Voters Try to Overrule a Top Judge, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 1985, at 71; Arie Press & Michael Reese, Bird Hunting in 
California, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 9, 1985, at 30; Arie Press & Michael Reese, A Vote on the Quality 
of Mercy, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 3, 1986, at 63. A similar reputation formed the basis of a strong but 
unsuccessful challenge to the reelection of Chief Justice James Exum of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court. See Diane Luber, Heated Race Puts Partisan Judicial Election in Question, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 2, 1986, at 35A; Steve Riley, Death Penalty Emerges 
as Key Issue in Campaign for N.C. Chief Justice, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 21, 
1986, at Al. 
172. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term -Foreword: The Van· 
ishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 98 (1989); Sager, supra note 96, at 1220. 
173. See generally Gardner, supra note 168, at 805-06. 
174. Sager, supra note 96, at 1221; see also Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide 
to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 589 (1975) ("Decisions not striking down 
laws do not always mean that the laws are constitutional, however, for a court's failure to invnli· 
date may only reflect its institutional limitations."). 
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force that can fill the void, adding a measure of enforcement to consti-
tutional norms that the Supreme Court, because of its own limitations, 
cannot itself provide. Thus conceived, state constitutional law is not a 
liberal activist's ploy to evade the Supreme Court's Eighth Amend-
ment doctrine, 175 but in fact an integral means to complement the fed-
eral law. 
The norms that the Supreme Court uses to address capital punish-
ment's fundamental legitimacy are not exclusive to the federal Consti-
tution. The principles of moral appropriateness, rational orderliness, 
and procedural fairness resonate as convincingly within the bounda-
ries of a state as they do throughout the nation at large and thus can 
act as norms of state constitutional law that the state judiciary is obli-
gated to enforce. In implementing these norms, a state court might 
well reserve the same right to balance that the U.S. Supreme Court 
reserves for itself, accommodating whatever relevant concerns might 
weigh against the fullest enforcement of the values in question. The 
important point, however, is that a state court will have to balance/or 
itself because the concerns that are relevant to the exercise of state 
judicial power are not the same as those which are germane to federal 
action. Federal and state courts are different institutions differently 
positioned, facing different claims on the exercise of their powers and 
different restraining influences. The costs associated with the use of 
federal judicial power are one matter; the costs of using state judicial 
power to the same end can be quite another. It makes no sense, indeed 
it is unprincipled and irrational, for a state court uncritically to adopt 
as its own a balance struck by the U.S. Supreme Court. Depending on 
the circumstances, it is certainly possible for the federal balance and 
the state balance to tilt in the same direction. But this possibility can-
not be confirmed until the state court balances the relevant considera-
tions independently with intelligent awareness of the various 
differences. 176 
175. Some commentators have derided expansive state constitutional interpretations as re-
sult-oriented efforts to countermand conservative federal constitutional rulings by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No 
Anchor- Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 987 
(1979); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 
873, 873, 894 (1975); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State 
Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421, 434 (1974). 
176. Because Eighth Amendment normative concepts may easily be recognized in state con-
stitutions as well, there is no need to argue here for state court authority to heighten the enforce-
ment of those norms in the name of the federal Constitution. Some have contended that state 
courts have such authority generally. See Sager, supra note 96, at 1242-50; Robert C. Welsh, 
Whose Federalism? - The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties Judgments, 10 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 819, 862-68 (1983). The Supreme Court has suggested otherwise, see Oregon 
v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) ("[A] State may not impose ... greater restrictions as a matter 
of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them"), with 
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To illustrate, imagine a jurist grappling with the application of 
capital punishment to mentally retarded offenders. Suppose, further, 
that study has led the judge to recognize that cases exist in which the 
severity of the offender's handicap render the death penalty an exces-
sive and hence morally inappropriate punishment. What rule should 
the judge announce to implement the constitutional principle of moral 
appropriateness in these situations? One viable possibility would be to 
draw a line that categorically immunizes from the death penalty those 
offenders for whom it would most likely be excessive. But what are 
the costs of using judicial power in that way? The answer depends on 
where this hypothetical judge sits. 
If the President appointed this judge to the Supreme Court, the 
proposed ruling's impact on federalism values and on the federal judi-
ciary's effectiveness would weigh in her balancing. This Justice might 
note that state legislatures and courts have not wholly ignored the 
mentally retarded offender's claim to constitutional protection; indeed, 
most states deal with the problem by having their capital sentencers 
consider the offender's mental retardation as a mitigating circum-
stance entitled to some, but not legally dispositive, weight in an overall 
sentencing calculus.177 Supplanting those state judgments in favor of 
broader protection might be desirable, but inevitably would come at a 
price. Distanced from those state determinations, the Supreme Court 
Justice usually cannot know how much, if any, reflection and delibera-
tion went into them. Federalism protocol thus prescribes - until 
some contrary reason surfaces - that the Court treat expressions of 
state policy as the products of reasoned, good faith efforts to harmo-
nize local wants with respect for constitutional principles. 178 When 
the Court overrides these dignified-by-hypothesis efforts, the authority 
of state institutions receives a direct hit, their enthusiasm for experi-
mentation wanes, and the Court's own reservoir of good will dips. 
Moreover, these consequences are magnified if the Court's preferred 
rule is, as bright-line formulations sometimes are, open to easy criti-
cism as inappropriately legislative in nature. 179 How strongly these 
considerations figure in the final balance need not be of concern now, 
understandable though debatable reasons. See TRIBE, supra note 96, § 3-4, at 40-41 (essaying to 
explain why "Hass rule serves on balance to advance rather than retard responsible constitu-
tional decisionmaking"). 
177. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 337-38 & nn.2 & 3 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, 
J.). 
178. For an example of contrary reasons surfacing, consider Justice O'Connor's opinion in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 848-59 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) 
(refusing to presume, in the absence of explicit statutory statement, that state legislature pur-
posely intended to make juveniles under the age of 16 eligible for capital punishment). 
179. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 47, at 241-42; Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in 
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although readers familiar with Penry v. Lynaugh 180 know the decisive 
weight that the Supreme Court assigned to them. For our purposes, it 
is enough to identify them.181 
If the judge presides on the state supreme court and undertakes to 
evaluate the wisdom of the same rule under the state constitution, the 
countervailing considerations should look different for reasons entirely 
associated with the jurisdictional change. First and most obviously, 
any adverse institutional ramifications of granting greater protection 
to the mentally retarded offender are bound to be fewer in number and 
less daunting in magnitude simply because they will be confined to a 
single jurisdiction. State courts work in a relatively closed microcosm; 
rarely, and even then only if they really exert themselves, can they 
make state constitutional capital punishment law that does any appre-
ciable violence to another state's institutions or impedes another 
state's freedom to experiment and meet local needs. 182 Second, the 
court's close proximity to the affected system will allow it to give the 
potential institutional costs a finer appraisal and more accurate ac-
counting. Unlike the Supreme Court, which must generalize across 
the nation, state judges enjoy an intimate familiarity with how policy 
and law are formulated at the state level, since they help produce the 
tapestry of constitutional, legislative, and judge-made law that consti-
tutes the state's corpus juris. They know firsthand the roles of the vari-
ous institutions of state government, their strengths and weaknesses, 
and the legal and customary relationships between them. State judges 
understand better than most the structure and operation of the state's 
criminal justice system. They need not indulge in speculative assump-
tions about the climate that produced the state's modern capital pun-
ishment enactments and the judicial constructions that have been 
placed upon them. 
Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. R.E.v. 100, 123-56 
(1985). 
180. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (refusing to hold the death penalty categorically unconstitutional as 
applied to the mentally retarded). 
181. Until Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the federal accounting might also have in-
cluded the potential costs associated with upending final judgments that failed to comport with 
the more protective constitutional rule. As constitutional litigators know, a judge's fear of"mak-
ing any rulings that .•• may open the door to 'general gaol delivery' " can operate as a disincen-
tive to the making of new law or the extension (or even the forthright application) of old law. 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Foreword, in 1 JAMES s. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE i, v-ix (1988). Conversely, a stingy approach to retroactivity "avoid[s] 
the problem of the jail delivery" and thus eliminates or reduces "one of the traditional inhibitions 
associated with the exercise of judicial power." Allen, supra note 135, at 530. 
182. For an example, see Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (holding that Missis-
sippi Supreme Court violated the Eighth Amendment when it let stand a death sentence based in 
part upon a prior conviction in New York that had been vacated by the New York Court of 
Appeals). 
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How might this positional advantage affect the judge's determina-
tion in the case of the mentally retarded offender? Depending upon 
the state in question, she might conclude that a more protective state 
constitutional rule would not impinge upon institutional prerogatives 
or principles of democratic self-governance in the way that a genera-
lized conjecture might lead her to fear. 
A close look might reveal, first, that the local practice of treating 
mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance in the sentencing deci-
sion does not represent a considered societal judgment against broader 
protection. Perhaps the practice originated in the post-Furman rush 
to get some capital sentencing law on the books that stood a chance of 
winning the Supreme Court's approval, or maybe it simply came about 
as a defensive reaction to Lockett v. Ohio's dictate that all mitigating 
factors at the very least be put to the sentencer for its consideration. 183 
In either case, there is a substantial likelihood that neither the People 
nor any of their state institutions actually rejected greater protection 
for the mentally retarded offender's constitutional interest as an inor-
dinate sacrifice of other state interests. Implementing the more protec-
tive rule, accordingly, would not signify a direct challenge to another 
department's judgment. 
A decision to promulgate the more protective rule would curtail 
the legislature's freedom to respond differently to the problem in days 
to come. Rulings of genuinely constitutional dimension generally have 
that effect, 184 but further inquiry by the state court could reveal good 
reasons for discounting its seriousness in this case. State laws, policies, 
traditions, and practices, for instance, may demonstrate an ambiva-
lence about using the death penalty in the case of mentally retarded 
offenders that belies any claim that significant countervailing interests 
need debate in the political arena. 185 The treatment of the mentally 
retarded in other contexts within and beyond the criminal justice sys-
tem might fortify that conclusion. Furthermore, local sources also 
might provide a vocabulary the court could use in articulating the 
new, more protective state constitutional rule, ensuring a smoother in-
183. 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
184. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword: Constitu-
tional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1-30, 33 (1975) (noting that a "true constitutional 
rule" cannot be altered or overridden by legislation, but developing thesis that some rulings 
interpretive of constitutional rights establish "constitutional common law," which can). 
185. A local inquiry possibly might reveal that prosecutors refrain from pursuing the death 
penalty against mentally retarded offenders, or that local juries tend to favor imposing life 
sentences upon mentally retarded offenders even in severely aggravated cases. Similar evidence 
of a national nature has been deemed relevant to the disposition of questions under the Eighth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 
492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989). 
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tegration of the rule into existing practice and blunting any charge 
that the court's standard lacks an acceptable foundation. 
When considerations like the foregoing are present, they can swing 
the balance decisively in favor of broader judicial enforcement of the 
constitutional norm. So it was in Fleming v. Zant, 186 a Georgia 
Supreme Court decision forbidding the death penalty for mentally re-
tarded offenders under the state constitution. True, the case was espe-
cially easy because Georgia's legislature had recently passed a statute 
prospectively immunizing the mentally retarded from capital punish-
ment.187 A different state court facing different local conditions 
should not follow Fleming uncritically, for the question might be con-
siderably closer in its own jurisdiction. But, for the very same reason, 
it would be a mistake for that court to accept uncritically the balance 
struck by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penry. Independent judgment is 
necessary, and independent judgment is where state constitutional law 
begins. 
There are signs that state court judges have started to think in 
these terms in death cases. In a textbook example of critical independ-
ent assessment, the Louisiana Supreme Court held in State v. Perry 188 
that the state constitutional prohibition against cruel, excessive, or un-
usual punishment forbids the practice of forcibly medicating a defend-
ant in order to make him sane enough to be executed. Pivotal to the 
case was the court's candid recognition that it need not, as a state 
court adjudicating under the state constitution, indulge in the kind of 
deferential assumptions that federalism principles might require if the 
case arose under the federal Constitution. From that premise, the 
court confidently concluded that the practice in question would in-
fringe upon a "well-established norm," the moral prohibition against 
execution of a prisoner who has lost his sanity, and that the practice 
would do so without a hint of justification founded upon local consen-
sus or legislative pronouncement.189 Of similar import is the Colorado 
Supreme Court's decision in People v. Young. 190 There, the court re-
lied upon its appreciation of the facts of local institutional life - to 
wit, a trial level sentencer's superiority over the legislature when it 
comes to rendering judgments about the moral correctness of the 
186. 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989). 
187. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Supp. 1991). The constitutional question arose because 
the legislature made specific its intent that the law apply only prospectively, and not retroac-
tively, to defendants like Fleming who were already awaiting execution. 
188. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992). 
189. 610 So. 2d at 749-50. 
190. 814 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1991). 
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death penalty in specific factual settings - to invalidate legislation 
that required imposition of the death penalty upon a jury finding that 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances balance equally.191 Critical 
independent assessments have also been undertaken, with expectedly 
mixed results, in Tennessee,192 Indiana,193 New Jersey,194 and North 
Carolina.195 
I suspect that some hard-core death penalty supporters take a dim 
view of these developments, but believers in federalism should be 
pleased. The federal system is at its best when the states understand 
their independent obligation to heed and promote constitutional val-
ues. No governmental institution - federal or state; executive, legis-
lative, or judicial - can single-handedly ensure the full realization of 
constitutional values. The task requires tremendous power, much 
more than the American people have been willing to entrust in any 
single governmental body. That power has been diffused vertically 
and horizontally throughout the federal system to guard against its 
abuse - but not to prevent it from effectuating constitutional 
norms. 196 When a state court grasps these basics and uses its power to 
supplement the enforcement of fundamental values pursuant to the 
state constitution, listen carefully to the objections and consider the 
source. 
B. The Law Beneath the State Constitution 
At times, a state court's critical independent assessment will sug-
gest the possibility of greater enforcement of a capital punishment 
191. 814 P.2d at 845. Query whether the U.S. Supreme Court, encumbered by the federalism 
concerns that restrain its doctrinemaking under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), would go 
so far. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651 (1990); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 376-
77 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 300-05 (1990). But see Young, 814 P.2d at 
845-46 (refusing to interpret Walton, Boyde, and Blystone as resolving the issue in favor of 
constitutionality). 
192. State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 341-47 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the use of an 
underlying felony as aggravating circumstance in a case of felony murder fails to narrow ade-
quately the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty, and thus fails under state and 
federal constitutions), cerL granted, 113 S. Ct. 1840 (1993); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 193· 
97 (Tenn. 1991) (invalidating "especially heinous" aggravating circumstance under the state con· 
stitution for failure to channel adequately sentencer's discretion). 
193. Cooper v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1216, 1218-20 (Ind. 1989) (invalidating on state constitu-
tional grounds application of death penalty to person who was 15 years of age at time of offense). 
194. State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 993-95 (N.J. 1988) (holding that constitutional and 
statutory interests in safeguarding reliability of death sentencing decisions dictate the rule that a 
defendant may not waive the right to present mitigating evidence), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017 
(1989). 
195. State v. Smith, 392 S.E.2d 362, 363 (N.C. 1990) (finding a broad and unwaivable right 
of capital defendant to be present at critical stages of trial under state constitution). 
196. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J, 1131, 
1132-33 (1991); Amar, supra note 129, at 1426-27, 1429. 
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norm than the Supreme Court has mandated, but not so convincingly 
as to justify carving a more protective rule in state constitutional 
stone. However, that realization hardly ends the analysis. The state 
court is not limited to implementing fundamental values through 
hard-and-fast constitutional rules that only judicial reconsideration or 
constitutional amendment can change.197 
To the contrary. Anyone familiar with capital punishment as 
practiced knows that the lion's share of state death penalty law is not 
only judge made, but subconstitutional in nature. State capital punish-
ment statutes may not be as open-ended as, say, the Rules Enabling 
Act, 198 but they surely leave countless important and recurrent issues 
unresolved. Some of those issues no doubt were unanticipated, 
whereas. others probably were left to the courts for later resolution 
informed by experience with the statute in operation. 199 In either case, 
courts routinely plug the statutory gaps by drawing upon their power 
to construe legislation, to fashion common law, and to supervise 
adjudication. 
A state court's broad powers to make interstitial law obviously can 
be used to supplement the protection of constitutional capital punish-
ment norms which have been underenforced by the federal judiciary. 
Indeed, critics of capital punishment - concededly disgruntled with 
developments in the federal courts - have begun to press the point 
enthusiastically, proposing ways that state courts might augment the 
protections they afford capital defendants and compensate for the cut-
backs in federal judicial scrutiny.200 As to all such proposals, how-
197. Before passing the point, it merits observation that state constitutional rulings are more 
easily undone by amendment than federal constitutional rulings - an institutional consideration 
that weighs in favor of broader judicial enforcement of constitutional norms at the state level. 
Compare U.S. CONST. art. V (amendment requires ratification by three fourths of the states) with, 
e.g., N.C. CoNST. art. XIII, § 4 (amendment by legislative initiative, taking three-fifths majority, 
and electoral ratification by simple majority). "[l]t is said that the Amending Clause of the 
[Federal] Constitution has been employed to reverse the work of the Court only twice, perhaps 
three times; and it has never been used to take away or diminish the Court's power." ALEXAN· 
DER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 21 (1962). 
Indeed, New Jersey voters recently availed themselves of the amendment process to overrule 
State v. Gerald, 549 A.2d 792, 810-19 (N.J. 1988) (holding that only defendants who intend to 
kill are eligible for capital punishment under the state constitution). See Jerry Gray, The 1992 
Campaign: New Jersey - The Ballot Issues: Voters Approve Broader Use of the Death Penalty, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at B15 (discussing referendum); Joseph F. Sullivan, Impact of Death-
Penalty Amendment Appears Limited, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at BS (discussing 
referendum). 
198. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1988). 
199. Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who 
Won't, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 787, 801 & n.89 (1963); James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory 
Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REv. 886, 893 (1930). 
200. See, e.g., Margery M. Koosed, Some Perspectives on the Possible Impact of Diminished 
Federal Review of Ohio's Death Sentences, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 695 (1990). 
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ever, the fair response is "Why?" Why should a state court make 
interstitial law to "compensate" for the alleged shortcomings of fed-
eral death penalty jurisprudence? The ideas developed above show 
that principled reasons rooted in Eighth Amendment capital punish-
ment jurisprudence - and not just somebody's personal preference for 
a different result - commend that course. When the federal judiciary 
stops short and underenforces Eighth Amendment norms, such action 
is theoretically justified by the promise that states will use their free-
dom to further, rather than detract from, capital punishment's legiti-
macy and endeavor in good faith to integrate constitutional values into 
the fabric of local law, policy, and practice. Federal underenforce-
ment becomes tolerable because it creates space for states to govern 
responsibly, solving problems inventively and with a sensitivity to nu-
ances which the Supreme Court cannot provide. That rationale for 
federal restraint is defeated when state courts default upon their obli-
gation to bring a critical independent eye to capital punishment 
problems and to exercise principled and measured judgment. 
A state court attuned to these observations and alert to its assigned 
duty in the constitutional scheme should quickly see the important 
role that interstitial judicial lawmaking must play in the quest to legiti-
mate capital punishment. Quite simply, when a state court acts inter-
stitially it can extend added protection to underenforced Eighth 
Amendment norms at bargain basement prices. 
First, a sizeable portion of the institutional cost of such interstitial 
lawmaking - the price of making law before the political process has 
addressed the point in question - will be incurred whether or not the 
court rules in favor of greater norm enforcement. To dispose of the 
case, the court necessarily must resolve the legislatively unanswered 
question, at least implicitly, and thus will make law that binds until 
further notice.201 The costs actually attributable to giving that judge-
made law a more norm-protective cast are thus incremental. 
Second, those marginal costs will frequently prove insufficient to 
justify the court in passing up the benefits, assuming that the judicial 
analysis is undertaken objectively and with no hostility toward the 
constitutional norms themselves. In the right circumstances, a fair-
minded, independent assessment will lead the court to conclude that a 
201. Sometimes courts purport to refuse to answer a question necessary to the resolution of a 
case, explicitly passing the matter to the legislature for its determination. See, e.g., Texas Indus., 
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981); United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 
511-13 (1954); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 316-17 (1947). In such cases, the 
judicial decision nevertheless establishes a rule of law, announcing the way in which similarly 
positioned cases will b.e decided until legislative action dictates otherwise. See BATOR ET AL., 
supra note 26, at 949-50 (noting that such decisions are not "neutral"). 
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more protective rule would fit reasonably well into its own existing 
system and would not likely impede the fair and efficient prosecution 
of capital cases. No one can guarantee the correctness of the court's 
evaluation, but the state judiciary's superior vantage point and its un-
surpassed experience in regulating the criminal adjudicative process 
make its determination creditworthy. Since the legislature has not 
spoken to the point - indeed, it may even have deliberately left the 
problem to the judiciary - the court also can take comfort that a 
decision in favor of greater norm enforcement is less apt to offend in-
stitutional prerogatives, legislative sensibilities, or a statewide 
consensus. 
Third, choosing a more protective rule directly serves the legisla-
ture's most fundamental intention: that courts construe and apply the 
state's death penalty legislation to maintain its continued, long-run 
constitutionality. Like the maxim that counsels avoidance of statutory 
interpretations that raise constitutional complications,202 a policy that 
favors filling statutory interstices with rules that promote under-
enforced Eighth Amendment norms can be a valuable form of preven-
tive medicine, guarding the state's death penalty system against future 
shocks in the event that the U.S. Supreme Court upwardly revises its 
estimation of the federally enforceable minimums. 203 
Fourth, if a judicial decision favoring greater norm enforcement 
turns out to have been mistaken, or if changed circumstances render it 
inadvisable, the costs of correction or modification by either the legis-
202. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring) (elaborating the maxim); Thayer, supra note 96, at 144 (positing judicial self-
restraint as rationale for the rule). 
203. Consider, for example, the trouble that North Carolina could have avoided had its state 
court chosen the path of greater norm enforcement when making the interstitial law that was 
struck down in McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 438-44 (1990) (invalidating state 
court's interpretation of ambiguous legislation to require that mitigating circumstances cannot be 
considered in sentencing decision unless accepted by a unanimous jury). Even assuming that 
federal habeas corpus relief will not require the reversal of cases that become final before the 
defective state rule was invalidated by the Supreme Court in McKoy, but see Williams v. Dixon, 
961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.) (holding that McKoy qualifies for exception to Teague v. Lane's antire-
troactivity rule), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 510 (1992), cases in the direct appeal pipeline when 
McKoy was decided must be remedied whenever infected by the error. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 
U.S. 314, 328 (1987). At present count, the North Carolina Supreme Court has had to reverse 
and remand 42 cases under McKoy for costly resentencing proceedings in the trial division. 
Some might discount the value of cautious interstitial lawmaking, since Teague v. Lane pre-
vents the retroactive application in federal habeas of most new constitutional rules. But state 
judges would be wise to think twice before placing too much reliance upon Teague. For one 
thing, the Supreme Court has never been able to settle for long upon a consistent approach to 
retroactivity, and the current Court may prove no better. See supra notes 9, 35. For another 
thing, Teague is subject to modification or overruling by Congress. Proposals to that effect have 
been introduced in recent years. See, e.g .• JAMES s. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL 
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.3 (Supp. 1992) (discussing such proposals); 
Berger, supra note 11, at 1674-1713 (same). 
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lature or the court itself are relatively modest. Judge-made interstitial 
law is written in easily erasable ink. 204 
It would be premature to say that state courts are consciously 
modeling their behavior along the foregoing lines. I argue that they 
should, and I hope that they will. Though experience warns against 
expecting too much, there is cause for cautious optimism. State courts 
already have handed down a number of progressive interstitial rulings 
that make perfect sense when the dynamics of balancing and norm 
enforcement are considered. In Florida,2os Indiana,206 and New 
Jersey,207 for instance, state courts have interpreted statutory aggra-
vating circumstances to require proof of a defendant's individualized 
mens rea, thus increasing the likelihood that the circumstances will 
serve as meaningful indicators of the moral appropriateness of the 
death penalty. To similar effect, interstitial rulings in Alabama,208 
North Carolina,209 Mississippi,21° and Wyoming211 now prohibit the 
use of duplicative aggravating factors that create the false illusion of 
heightened culpability. The supreme courts of Georgia212 and Ken-
tucky213 have made capital sentencing trials safer from the subtle dis-
torting influences of class and racial bias by holding victim-impact 
evidence inadmissible under state law, Payne v. Tennessee 214 notwith-
204. The legislature can overrule the court by passing corrective legislation, or the court 
itself can point to a newly emerged legislative intention and give the rule a "respectful burial", cf. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349-52 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (expressing view 
that Court can respectfully overrule its own precedents when their premises are eroded by legal 
evolution or overtaken by changed factual circumstances). 
205. Omelus v. State, 584 So. 2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1991) (adopting narrow construction of "hei-
nousness" statutory aggravating circumstance to forbid vicarious attribution of culpability). 
206. Castor v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1281, 1289-90 (Ind. 1992) (interpreting aggravating circum-
stance based upon victim's status as law enforcement officer to require defendant's knowledge of 
victim's status, and not merely defendant's negligence or recklessness as to the existence of the 
fact). 
207. State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 229-31 (N.J. 1987) (interpreting "torture" aggravating 
circumstance to require a showing of conscious purpose on the part of the defendant that victim 
experienced suffering). 
208. Windsor v. State, 593 So. 2d 87, 92 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (prohibiting use of "pecuni-
ary gain" aggravating factor in case of robbery-murder), cert. denied, 1910005, 1992 LEXIS 164 
(Ala. Jan. 31 1992). 
209. State v. Davis, 386 S.E.2d 418, 431 (N.C. 1989) (prohibiting use of "pecuniary gain" 
factor in conjunction with aggravating circumstance that killing was committed in the course of 
robbery), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905 (1990). 
210. Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660, 680-81 (Miss. 1991) (prohibiting use of "pecuniary gain" 
factor in case of robbery-murder); Ladner v. State, 584 So. 2d 743, 762-63 (Miss. 1991) (same). 
211. Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 87-90 (Wyo. 1991) (prohibiting use of "pecuniary gain" 
factor in conjunction with aggravating circumstance that killing was committed in the course of 
robbery). 
212. Sermons v. State, 417 S.E.2d 144, 146 (Ga. 1992). 
213. Clark v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 793, 796-97 (Ky. 1991). 
214. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). 
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standing. Residual doubt about the defendant's guilt - something 
that human beings instinctively find germane to the morality of capital 
punishment, but which the Supreme Court for institutional reasons 
has been reluctant to bring within the ambit of constitutionally pro-
tected mitigating factors215 - can be pressed at sentencing in South 
Carolina216 and Ohio.21' The North Carolina Supreme Court has 
gone beyond the federally enforceable minimum to restrict 
prosecutorial discretion in the name of greater rationality and consis-
tency. 218 In that state,219 and in New Jersey too,220 courts have as-
sured fairer and more thoughtful consideration of nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances by requiring that they be presented to the 
jury in written and oral instructions in the same way that statutory 
mitigating factors are presented. In Mississippi221 and New Mex-
ico, 222 courts have instituted procedures to check the irrational distor-
tion in moral judgment that takes place when jurors erroneously 
assume that a life sentence will lead to the defendant's eventual release 
on parole.223 
State courts do the right thing when they take advantage of their 
unique institutional capacities to supplement the enforcement of 
Eighth Amendment norms and thereby further the legitimacy of the 
death penalty.224 But if the intrinsic rewards of following the constitu-
tional plan are not incentive enough, state judges might wish to re-
215. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-76 (1988) (plurality opinion of White, J.). 
216. State v. Davis, 411 S.E.2d 220, 222-23 (S.C. 1991). 
217. State v. Watson, 572 N.E.2d 97, 111 (Ohio 1991). 
218. Compare State v. Case, 410 S.E.2d 57, 59-60 (N.C. 1991) (denying prosecutor the dis-
cretion to withhold aggravating circumstances from the sentencer's consideration) with McCles-
key v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311-12 (1987) (upholding prosecutorial discretion in capital 
sentencing context) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (plurality opinion) (validat-
ing prosecutorial discretion to proceed noncapitally in a case where an aggravating circumstance 
might be established). 
219. State v. Cummings, 389 S.E.2d 66, 81 (N.C. 1990). 
220. State v. Biegenwald, 594 A.2d 172, 195-97 (N.J. 1991). 
221. Berry v. State, 575 So. 2d 1, 13 (Miss. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2042 (1991); Turner 
v. State, 573 So. 2d 657, 673-75 (Miss. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1695 (1991). 
222. State v. Henderson, 789 P.2d 603, 606-07 (N.M. 1990). 
223. For analysis of this recurrent problem, see Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford 
Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death 
Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. R.Ev. 211, 231-38, 244-49 (1987), and William W. Hood, III, 
Note, The Meaning of ''Life" for Virginia Jurors and its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentenc-
ing, 75 VA. L. REV. 1605 (1989); see also J. Mark Lane, "Is There Life Without Parole?'': A 
Capital Defendant's Right to a Meaningful Alternative Sentence, 26 LoY. L.A. L. R.Ev. 327 
(1993); Julian H. Wright, Jr., Note, Life-Without-Parole: An Alternative to Death or Not Much of 
a Life at All?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1990). 
224. I have focused on interstitial lawmaking by state judges because capital punishment is 
an overwhelmingly state phenomenon. The propositions advanced in the text would also bear on 
the practice of the federal courts in cases arising under federal death penalty legislation. 
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member that federal judicial intervention is invited when the state 
defaults on its obligation to reach some independently reasoned resolu-
tion of the hard questions relating to administration of the death pen-
alty. When a state fails in this respect, federalism's theoretical 
promises are not being realized in practice, the interests which counsel 
judicial restraint at the federal level lose their weight, and the federal 
judicial balance accordingly swings in the direction of greater norm 
enforcement. This point has not eluded Justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Read between the lines of Justice Kennedy's concurring opin-
ion in Murray v. Giarratano, 225 or Justice O'Connor's concurrence in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 226 and you will see its logic at work. 
C. Conceptualizing Clemency 
The foregoing ideas also reveal clemency's proper role in society's 
effort to legitimate capital punishment through the furtherance of 
Eighth Amendment norms. The power that states traditionally vest in 
their executives to grant clemency and spare a condemned inmate 
from the executioner227 figured importantly in the pre-Furman history 
of American capital punishment, 228 but the same cannot be said for 
the twenty years that have followed Furman. Although every state 
that employs the death penalty provides for clemency review by stat-
ute or constitutional mandate,229 and though the Court has intimated 
that such review might be necessary under the Eighth Amendment,230 
225. 492 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989) (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
See supra note 143. 
226. 487 U.S. 815, 848-59 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); see supra note 142. 
227. Twenty-nine states place clemency power in the governor alone, often establishing advi-
sory boards that make nonbinding recommendations. In 16 states, clemency power is shared by 
the governor and an administrative board. In five states, a board holds the clemency power, but 
its members are appointed by the governor. Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: 
Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 569, 605 (1991) (reviewing state 
practices). For simplicity, the discussion will assume that the clemency power is vested in the 
state's governor as chief executive. 
228. Deborah Leavy, Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process Protection in Capital 
Clemency Proceedings, 90 YALE L.J. 889, 895-96 (1981). For an examination of the history of 
clemency in death cases, see Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Note, Executive Clemency in 
Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 137-41 (1964). 
229. See Hugo A. Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. 
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255, 256 (1990-1991) (reviewing state practices); Kobil, supra note 227, 
at 605 (same); Koosed, supra note 200, at 752-56 (same); Paul W. Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving 
Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99 YALE L.J. 389, 392 n.16 (1989) (same); see also 
Daniel T. Kobil, Do the Paperwork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 655 (1991) 
(discussing Ohio's capital clemency practices); Joseph B. Schimmel, Comment, Commutation of 
the Death Sentence: Florida Steps Back from Justice and Mercy, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 253 
(1992) (discussing Florida's capital clemency practices). 
230. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (refusing to 
condemn the discretion inherent in executive clemency, and noting that a system without execu· 
tive clemency "would be totally alien to our notions of criminal justice"). Commentators have 
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the prevailing wisdom holds that clemency in death cases entered a 
nosedive at roughly the same moment that judicial regulation of capi-
tal punishment under the Eighth Amendment skyrocketed. 231 
It took sharp cutbacks in federal habeas review to supply the impe-
tus, but the squandering of the clemency power in the post-Furman 
years is now finally drawing serious critical attention in the legal com-
munity. 232 A call for clemency's revitalization has been sounded,233 
and several constructive steps that might spur movement toward that 
goal have been proposed. Some of these suggestions aim to bolster the 
affirmative policy case for broader capital clemency review by demon-
strating how it would serve the goals of punishment,234 add an essen-
tial measure of mercy to the system, 235 and supply the "necessary 
assurances to the public respecting the reliability and non-arbitrariness 
of punishment" that state and federal courts seem unwilling to 
provide.236 The remaining proposals, predictably enough, seek to 
make the commutation of death sentences a more attractive practical 
option for the executive by reducing the associated social237 and 
relied on the Gregg plurality's recognition of clemency's substantial historical pedigree to argue 
that the Eighth Amendment may require that capital sentencing systems contain a clemency 
component. See Cobb, supra note 229, at 400-02; Leavy, supra note 228, at 906-07. 
231. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 5, at 95-105; Bedau, supra note 229, at 261-66; 
Koosed, supra note 200, at 759-63; Cobb, supra note 229, at 393-95. 
232. Amnesty International asked for it in 1987. See AMNESTY INTL., UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY 106-07 (1987). 
While some good literature on capital clemency predated the Supreme Court's contraction of 
the federal judicial role in death cases in the late 1980s, see, e.g., Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 
228, and Leavy, supra note 228, the literature was "devoid of solutions to the more fundaniental 
problem of how to encourage clemency-granting authorities to be merciful, in the face of the 
political unpopularity of executive clemency decisions and the unwillingness of many courts to 
allow juries to exercise merciful discretion." Cobb, supra note 229, at 390 n.2. 
The past few years have produced a number of interesting examinations of capital clemency. 
See, e.g., Bedau, supra note 229; Koosed, supra note 200, at 752-807; Cobb, supra note 229; see 
also Kobil, supra note 227 (discussing clemency generally, without particular focus on capital 
punishment). 
233. "[W]hat can be done to keep clemency hearings from becoming an empty formality, as 
some observers have complained has already happened? What if anything can be done to get 
governors and pardon boards to exercise their authority to review meaningfully ... ?" Bedau, 
supra note 229, at 270. 
234. See, e.g., id. at 271 (suggesting that "clemency should be viewed, like punishment itself, 
from a retributive point of view"); Koosed, supra note 200, at 778-82 (discussing clemency's 
consistency with retributive principles of punishment). 
235. Cobb, supra note 229, at 407-08 (advocating that the concept of mercy, as rooted in 
history, should serve as a guiding principle for clemency review). 
236. Koosed, supra note 200, at 756-63 (arguing that clemency serves a historical role of 
"filling in gaps in the legal system"). 
237. Professor Bedau, for instance, points out that favorab(e clemency decisions Inight be 
encouraged by making the sentence of life-without-parole an alternative to the death penalty and 
by undertaking clemency review before costly postconviction litigation ensues. Bedau, supra 
note 229, at 271-72. 
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political238 costs, both actual and perceived. 
Both approaches hold out some promise, framed as they are to 
appeal to a governor's political and policy instincts. But governors 
must understand that the revitalization of clemency is not merely a 
matter of choice. As the foregoing examination of the dynamics of 
Eighth Amendment enforcement demonstrates, meaningful clemency 
review is a governor's constitutional obligation. 
Under Article VI of the Federal Constitution, governors - like 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices and state judges - are "bound by Oath 
or Affirmation, to support this Constitution."239 There is no reason to 
suppose that this duty does not extend to the eminently public act of 
passing upon clemency applications. How that solemn obligation 
should inform a responsible governor's use of the clemency power is 
the question. One easy answer is that the executive must at least re-
frain from employing the power in a way that would abridge a consti-
tutional rule laid down by the courts to delimit state action - for 
example, the rule prohibiting purposeful racial discrimination in the 
administration of the death penalty.240 This responsibility, it bears 
emphasis, exists even if the courts decline, in a show of interinstitu-
tional respect, to review clemency decisions for compliance with such 
judicial dictates. 241 A constitutional wrong is a constitutional wrong, 
whether or not the wrongdoer avoids detection, apprehension, or 
sanction. 242 
But a governor cannot discharge the duty to support the federal 
Constitution merely by observing the explicit constitutional rules set 
forth by the courts, for those rules are a demonstrably incomplete ex-
pression of the Constitution's full meaning. The oath runs to the en-
tirety of the Constitution and thus professes allegiance to the 
238. Professor Margery Koosed has shown the extent to which the perceived political costs 
of granting clemency in death cases may be exaggerated. Koosed, supra note 200, at 782-93. 
239. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
240. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987). 
241. State courts have traditionally held that "the use of the clemency power for whatever 
reason, extra-legal or even illegal, is not reviewable." Cobb, supra note 229, at 392 n.19 (citing 
cases); see, e.g., 59 AM. JuR. 2o Pardon and Parole§ 31 (1987) (collecting cases). 
Some commentators have argued for judicial review of capital clemency decisions under the 
Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Leavy, supra note 228, at 902-05, 908-11 (urging that clemency in 
death cases be accompanied by procedural protections to guard against arbitrariness and capri· 
ciousness); see also Schimmel, supra note 229, at 259-60 (analyzing constitutional challenges 
against clemency in capital cases and noting that they have failed in the courts). The Supreme 
Court has not reached the question directly, although it has held that Florida's clemency review 
procedures were insufficient to determine an inmate's sanity in a constitutionally acceptable man· 
ner. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986) (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.). 
242. See TRIBE, supra note 96, § 3-4, at 36 (arguing that public officials are nonetheless 
under a moral obligation in such circumstances); Brest, supra note 174, at 587-89 (reaching the 
same conclusion). 
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Constitution's norms, including those that courts, for institutional or 
structural reasons, are unprepared to enforce fully themselves. In the 
words of Lawrence Sager: 
[G]overnment officials have a legal obligation to obey an underenforced 
constitutional norm which extends beyond its interpretation by the fed-
eral judiciary to the full dimensions of the concept which the norm em-
bodies. This obligation to obey constitutional norms at their unenforced 
margins requires governmental officials to fashion their own conceptions 
of these norms and measure their conduct by reference to these concep-
tions. Public officials cannot consider themselves free to act at what they 
perceive or ought to perceive to be peril to constitutional norms merely 
because the federal judiciary is unable to enforce these norms at their 
margins. 243 
The role of clemency review in the promotion of Eighth Amend-
ment norms thus emerges. Having received from the People the 
power to grant or deny clemency, the governor must exercise it in 
strict obedience to the Article VI affirmation. This means using the 
clemency power to realize more fully the Eighth Amendment's under-
enforced norms, because the governor's obligation under Article VI is 
to support the Constitution in its complete normative sense, not just in 
its judicially underenforced manifestation. By these lights, clemency is 
a powerful complementary force in society's effort to ensure that basic 
Eighth Amendment values are realized in individual death cases and 
that the administration of capital punishment is thus legitimated. To 
attain the constitutional fullest enforcement, separate and distinct in-
stitutions - the federal courts, the state courts~ and the state execu-
tives - have been set independently toward the same constitutional 
end, each institution protecting Eighth Amendment norms in ways 
that the others might not be able to effect. 244 
How should a governor therefore approach capital clemency appli-
cations? Conscientious clemency review would entail a critical in-
dependent assessment of each case to determine whether Eighth 
Amendment values have not been fully realized. Freed from the for-
mal strictures - substantive, procedural, evidentiary, and remedial -
that courts create to accommodate their own perceived needs, the gov-
ernor is uniquely situated to identify normative shortfalls in the cases 
that escaped detection or were left uncorrected by the courts; the gov-
ernor is uniquely empowered to eliminate them expeditiously through 
243. Sager, supra note 96, at 1227; accord TRIBE, supra note 96, § 3-4, at 38-39 (endorsing 
Sager's thesis); Brest, supra note 174, at 587-89 (stating similar views in less elaborated fashion). 
244. While this argument is certainly strengthened by positing that clemency review is essen-
tial to the constitutionality of a capital punishment scheme under the Eighth Amendment, see 
supra note 241, it does not depend upon that proposition. 
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commutation.245 Good, constitutionally respectable clemency review 
would capitalize on these institutional advantages. Anything less ren-
ders the clemency power a redundant superfluity and the executive 
branch a constitutional noncontributor. 
Illustrations are not hard to find. Suppose the evidence as a whole, 
including evidence inadmissible at trial and evidence that only came to 
light after trial, raises questions about the defendant's degree of in-
volvement in the killing that cast the moral appropriateness of the 
death penalty, but not its legality in a court of law, in serious doubt. 
Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder and North Carolina Governor 
James G. Martin were confronted with cases of this sort recently, and 
each wisely granted commutation.246 Imagine the defendant has 
shown convincing signs of rehabilitation during his years on death row 
245. Needless to say, this critical independent assessment cannot be made unless the gover-
nor comprehends the distinction between judicial rules that implement constitutional norms and 
the constitutional norms themselves. To deny clemency merely because "the courts have spo-
ken" misses the distinction entirely, and constitutes an abdication of the responsibility to employ 
the executive powers in independent service of constitutional norms. 
Like the federal and state judiciaries, a governor should be free to accommodate legitimate 
countervailing interests when exercising the power to implement constitutional norms through 
clemency. The accommodation must, however, be a principled one, and only those counter-
vailing interests that are genuinely relevant to the use of the power which the People have con-
ferred upon the executive should be considered in the balance. The governor's personal political 
fortunes, for instance, would not merit consideration. In the typical clemency case, few if any 
genuinely countervailing interests will be present. Where Eighth Amendment values weigh in 
favor of commutation, rarely will the granting of clemency adversely implicate the legitimate 
interests of another institution or require the sacrifice of any value of sufficient magnitude to 
outweigh the Eighth Amendment norms at stake. A grant of clemency, it must be remembered, 
conveys no disrespect for the decisions of the courts and lays down no rules intended to govern 
their behavior. 
Given the importance of a critical independent assessment, governors are well·advised to 
proceed with extreme caution in assessing proposals to formalize clemency review. Commenta-
tors have argued with some force that enhanced procedural safeguards should be adopted in 
clemency cases. See, e.g., Kobil, supra note 229, at 695-99; Kobil, supra note 227, at 633-36; 
Leavy, supra note 228, at 907-11. To the extent that such safeguards expand or facilitate the 
inquiry without undermining clemency's independence or its ability to detect the presence of 
underenforced constitutional norms, they should be welcomed. But the procedural rules favored 
by courts often produce normative underenforcement, generally because they accommodate insti-
tutional considerations which pertain to the judicial function. Adopting rules of this sort in 
clemency determinations might lead the governor to perpetuate the normative underenforce-
ment, yet provide no institutional benefit. 
By contrast, stringent procedural safeguards of the judicial variety rightly should be required 
when clemency review is used as an alternative to judicial review that otherwise would apply -
at least so long as the safeguards operate to the defendant's advantage. See Ford v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986) (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.) (holding Florida's clemency review 
procedures insufficient to render a constitutionally acceptable determination of defendant's san-
ity, a requisite to execution). 
246. Governor Wilder has commuted two capital sentences due to concerns about a defend-
ant's guilt. In January 1992, Wilder commuted the death sentence of Herbert R. Bassette, Jr., 
because Wilder could not " 'erase the presence of a reasonable doubt' " surrounding the convic-
tion. John F. Harris, Va. Death Sentence Commuted,· Wilder Cites Doubts About Inmate's Guilt, 
WASH. PoS"r, Jan. 24, 1992, at Dl (quoting Wilder's commutation order). Less than one year 
earlier, Wilder commuted Joseph Giarratano's death sentence for similar reasons. See Clemency 
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that, in any fair ba1ance, make the death pena1ty an unnecessarily ex-
cessive response to his crime and his character combined. Or suppose, 
once all the facts are finally in, that the defendant's death sentence 
stands out as disproportionate because other individuals, equally or 
more culpable for the very same offense, have received lighter 
sentences. Facing cases of both types recently, the Georgia Board of 
Pardons and Paroles granted clemency.247 
We live in cynica1 times, so it is natura1 to regard the grants of 
executive clemency in such cases as bold acts of politica1 courage. Per-
haps they are. But, properly understood, they are also acts of consti-
tutional obligation. It is only right that we begin treating them so. 
CONCLUSION 
If legitimating capita1 punishment means cleansing the process of 
arbitrariness, eliminating invidious influences, foreclosing errors, and 
eradicating unfairnesses, then the death penalty quite plainly will 
never be legitimate. Even if such abstract legitimacy were within our 
reach as human beings, we could not possibly achieve it without work-
ing major modifications upon our federal, multitiered, adversaria1, and 
discretionary system of crimina1 justice. It is for that reason, and be-
cause capital punishment's toll on society exceeds whatever negligible 
benefits it produces, that I remain convinced that the death pena1ty 
will, in time, pass from the American scene. Not in my time or yours, 
perhaps, but in time. 
in Richmond, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1991, at A20 (editorial praising Wilder's decision); Reason-
able Doubt Spared Inmate's Life, USA TODAY, Feb. 22, 1991, at 7A. 
Governor Martin commuted Anson Avery Maynard's death sentence on January 10, 1992, 
stating as follows: 
There is reasonable doubt in my mind as to whether the degree of involvement of Anson 
Avery Maynard in the murder of Stephen Henry is sufficiently clear to justify the death 
penalty. For that reason, I have commuted Anson Maynard's death sentence to life in 
prison without parole. It is for cases like this that the power of clemency is given to the 
governor. 
Gov. James G. Martin, Press Release from Governor's Communications Office, Jan. 10, 1992 
(copy on file with author); see also Bruce Henderson, Martin Commutes Man's Death Sentence, 
CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Jan. 11, 1992, at IA (discussing commutation). 
247. The Board commuted William Neal Moore's death sentence because evidence of 
Moore's rehabilitation and conversion to Christianity raised serious doubts about the moral ap-
propriateness of the death penalty in his case. Among those requesting that Moore's sentence be 
commuted were members of the victim's family, Mother Theresa, and Jesse Jackson. Ronald 
Smothers, A Day Short of Death, a Georgia Killer Is Given Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1990, at 
Al. 
Ex-Marine Harold Glenn Williams' death sentence was commuted by the Board due to con-
cerns about the proportionality of the sentence. A codefendant who entered a pl~ agreement 
received only a ten-year sentence, despite having been the "ringleader'' of the murder. See Jingle 
Davis, Ex-Marine's Death Sentence for Murder Is Commuted, ATLANTA J. & CoNST., Mar. 23, 
1991, at BS. No doubt, an appeal for leniency from former President Jimmy Carter helped; 
Williams had been a White House guard and played baseball with Carter at Camp David. See id. 
1702 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1643 
Until then, common civility and decent regard for Eighth Amend-
ment principles demand that society acknowledge a responsibility to 
make reasonable efforts - within the restrictions imposed by our gov-
ernmental structure and the limitations of the institutions that com-
prise it - to minimize the aforementioned evils. A collective societal 
endeavor, involving the various branches of government at both the 
federal and state levels, can never legitimate capital punishment in the 
abstract sense. But it can legitimate it in a looser and more relative 
sense of the word - one that takes Eighth Amendment values seri-
ously, yet recognizes that structural and institutional values are impor-
tant to the nation's well being and merit accommodation in the 
constitutional equation. 
The Supreme Court - for better or for worse, but not without 
precedential support - has embraced this latter conception of legiti-
macy and made it the foundation of current capital punishment juris-
prudence. In so doing, the Court has accomplished what few would 
have imagined possible a decade ago. The Justices have brought meth-
odological coherence, doctrinal stability, and a measure of constitu-
tional respectability to this once unruly area of the law. Moreover, 
they have managed to do so while reaffirming the fundamental norms 
that have animated Eighth Amendment death penalty law since its 
conception. 
Considerations of governmental structure, institutional capacity, 
and institutional responsibility clearly weigh heavily in the current 
Court's Eighth Amendment balance. Anyone expecting to engage in 
useful Eighth Amendment discussions today must be prepared to hear 
about them and must be willing to talk about them. But make no 
mistake about it: the central normative vocabulary of capital punish-
ment discourse since Furman - the principles of rational orderliness, 
moral appropriateness, and procedural fairness - survives today. Se-
curely recognized under the Eighth Amendment, those norms remain 
powerful enough to sustain meaningful inquiries into the appropriate-
ness of death penalty practices, to reveal injustices, to fashion claims 
for redress, and to make the case for continued reform. 
